

EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs

A stylized, high-contrast map of Eastern Europe, showing the outlines of countries like Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The map is rendered in a dark, almost black, color against a lighter background.

PARTY CONGRESS IN BUCHAREST

POLITICS IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK THEATER

REWRITING HISTORY: THE MEMORY HOLE

THROUGH YUGOSLAV EYES

**Romania's Party Chief
The Communist Commonwealth
Polish Planning
Comecon's Charter**

AUGUST 1960

35 CENTS

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EAST EUROPE

Formerly NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

ROCKETS AGAIN

JULY WAS A BUSY MONTH for the Soviet Premier. Bulldozing through Austria, Khrushchev lectured his hosts on the responsibilities of a neutral country and reminded them that they were living in an age of rocket warfare. "The fight for peace concerns everybody. The presence of rocket bases in northern Italy—and if they are used against the Socialist countries—would presuppose a violation of Austrian neutrality."

This attack on Austrian neutrality—for indeed a statement that neutrality is vitiated by rocket emplacements in a third country over which Austria has no control must be just that—is a particularly striking phase of the new aggressive Soviet foreign policy. Even in the days after the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, when scores of thousands of Hungarians were fleeing across the border to an openly sympathetic Austria, no such assault on that country's neutrality was made.

Back in the Kremlin a few days later Khrushchev continued his aggressive diplomacy by announcing that another US plane had been shot down over Soviet territory near the Kola Peninsula, that the USSR had the power to defend Cuba from American intervention, and that the disturbances in the new Congo Republic had resulted from a plot by the US and other NATO countries to preserve the Congo's "colonial status."



AFTER BUCHAREST

WHILE KHRUSHCHEV'S WORDS soared around the world the leaders of his East European dependencies were busy digesting the results of the Bucharest meeting in mid-June, at which the twelve Parties of the Communist bloc had reaffirmed their belief in "peaceful coexistence between countries with differing social systems." The Declaration had been an attempt to cover the rift between Moscow and Peiping, and to shore up Khrushchev's position as leader of the Communist world.

The East Europeans supported him stoutly, and those who had been most partial to the belligerent Chinese view of things in the past were firm in their agreement with Khrushchev now. Such unanimity throughout the area, where usually there is a discernible spectrum from "left" to "right," from "hard" to "soft," has not obtained in a long time. It is a nice irony that this unanimity is a firming of the ranks against China: a scant three years ago, after the Hungarian Revolt and the Polish October, when the whole area hovered just off the boil of ideological non-conformity, it was China's Chou En-lai who toured Eastern Europe and strove with much success to bring the area back to Moscow's heel.

FACTS OF LIFE

IF THE COMMUNIST BLOC was split between East and West in its attitude toward war, there was one subject on which all of the orthodox Parties—Chinese as well as Soviet and Satellite—agreed: the danger of Yugoslav "revisionism." Tito's doctrines had received their usual belaboring in Bucharest, and this time the Yugoslavs replied with some unflattering criticism of Romania. An article in the Belgrade *Komunist* on June 30 pointed out that the facts of life spoke more strongly for Tito's policies than

for those of Gheorghiu-Dej. Yugoslavia's much-maligned agriculture, run mostly by small independent peasants, had been far more productive in recent years than had that of Romania where the Communists are still engaged in collectivizing the peasantry. "Naturally," said *Komunist*, "to give the facts about Yugoslav industry, agriculture, economic management and foreign policy would completely destroy the picture of our country which was obviously needed both by Gheorghiu-Dej and by some other speakers at the Congress. . . ."

In coming months the attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism" will find new fuel. Tito is reported to be compounding his heresies by linking the Yugoslav economy more closely to the West. On July 1 a Custom Tariff went into effect which permits Yugoslav importers to purchase capital equipment abroad without going through the bureaucratic channels which are mandatory in other Communist countries. According to recent reports, the Yugoslavs are planning a currency reform, to be carried out under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund and with financial backing from Western countries, which will bring Yugoslavia into the economic community of the West. The Yugoslavs have tried to get economic assistance from the Soviet bloc without putting their heads into Moscow's political vise, but the Soviet leaders have refused to give aid unconditionally (as they sometimes do to other neutral and uncommitted nations).

TOGETHERNESS

THE FREEDOM OF THE Yugoslavs to determine their national fortunes must be galling to some of the leaders of the other East European Communist countries who have been forced to entrust their destinies to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. This is the Soviet-Satellite organization set up to integrate the economies of its member countries, supposedly on the basis of "equality, mutual advantage and noninterference in each other's internal affairs." (See Texts and Documents.) The Council always meets behind closed doors and issues communiques full of accomplishment, but there is reason to think that it has sometimes been a council of mutual disappointment. The Soviet bloc as a whole is short of the capital funds necessary to carry out all of the long-term projects that its planners have conceived, and at the same time to answer the popular demand for better living standards. Countries that are hard-pressed look enviously at their wealthier neighbors and suggest that there ought to be more international lending, but so far Comecon has done relatively little in this direction. Communist bankers seem to be less internationally minded than capitalist bankers.

AND GLOOM

THE CLASH OF NATIONAL interests that rages behind the doors of Comecon has brought a strange protest from Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Communist leader of Poland. The occasion was a meeting of the Central Committee, which was engaged in revising the draft of the new Five Year Plan to reduce the funds to be invested in housing and other needs of the average man so that higher sums could be devoted to agriculture and industry. The move was not calculated to increase Gomulka's popularity in a country where housing is a national scandal and where the number of marriages each year far exceeds the number of new apartments.

The Polish regime had evidently given in to strong pressures from Comecon (and, of course, from Moscow) founded on the argument that Poland is falling behind the other countries in its rate of economic growth. Toward the end of a long speech to his Central Committee, Gomulka implied that this distasteful move might not have been necessary if the Soviet bloc countries had been willing to shift investment capital around a little more freely. "In this regard," he said, "the maxim 'everybody for himself' still prevails, and this harms everybody. I do not want to probe into the reasons for this state of affairs, but . . . the Socialist countries have already lost much because of a lack of such coordination in the past." His remark was symbolic of the real problems that confront men engaged in the everyday business of governing the Communist countries, in contrast to the romantic pretensions that seem to have become the main business of the Soviet Premier.

Khrushchev dominates Romanian Party meeting



Applauding leaders at the Third Party Congress. In front, behind the sharpened pencils, is Chivu Stoica. Also on the podium, are Gheorghiu-Dej, Nikita Khrushchev and, in the back, Ion Maurer.

SWIAT (Warsaw), July 3, 1960

A Congress and a Summit

ANYONE CAN MAKE UP the rules of a game; the problem is to find players willing to follow the leader. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's "rules" proved unacceptable to the Western Big Three at the abortive summit conference in Paris last May, so the Soviet leader simply called his own conference attended by such faithful team players as the Communist Party bosses of Eastern Europe. Obediently, Poland's Gomulka, Hungary's Kadar, Czechoslovakia's Novotny, East Germany's Ulbricht and Bulgaria's Zhivkov trooped to Bucharest to attend the Third Romanian Party Congress, June 20-25. Before a cheering crowd Khrushchev once again defined the current Soviet ideological policy, and all the Soviet bloc Communists fell in step. Of equal significance was the reaction of the Communist Chinese delegate and of Peiping itself. Chinese divergences from the Khrushchev policy of "peaceful co-existence" with non-Communist States had already come into the open during and after the Paris meeting, but by the end of the Bucharest Congress the Sino-Soviet split had been glossed over, and a public stance of ideological unity was reaffirmed once again. Khrushchev's "middle way"—between the Scylla of "Chinese sectarianism" and the Charybdis of "Yugoslav revisionism"—proved to be the right way, at least as long as the wind blows stronger from Moscow than from Peiping.

As for the Romanian Party itself, the Congress produced no surprises. In the five years since the last Congress, Romania has been one of the most quiescent of the Satellites: the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, while stirring up some trouble among the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania, effected no change in overall Party policies. "Socialization" of agriculture and major investment in heavy industry continued; even the Moscow-Belgrade cold war was reflected more palely in Romania, which generally refrained

from violent attacks on the "Yugoslav revisionists." Among the most faithful lackeys of Moscow, the Romanian Party has gone through no crisis in ideology, and the Party hierarchy seems to have adopted the Khrushchev line without shedding any tears over the wane of Stalinism.

GHEORGHIU-DEJ REPORTS

In his report to the delegates, June 20, Party chief Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej announced that a majority of the Party membership now consisted of workers—54.6 percent, an increase of 12 percent since the last Congress. The Party now totalled 834,000, of whom 148,000 were candidates, representing a 40 percent rise in membership over the past five years. In social composition, the Party members and candidates included 428,000 industrial workers, 280,000 representatives of the agricultural sector, 93,000 intellectuals. Gheorghiu-Dej evinced some concern that women made up only 17 percent of Party membership and that many Party organizations spent too much time in "deliberation" and not enough time "in action."

The bulk of the First Secretary's speech was devoted to evaluating Romanian economic achievements and to outlining the goals for the next Six Year Plan (see page 7). He particularly emphasized the growth in "Socialized agriculture," declaring that the collectivization program will be completed by 1965. He also predicted a growth of industrial production by 13 percent annually during this same period.

Turning to the international scene, Gheorghiu-Dej gave fulsome praise to the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals. The whole world, he said, was watching the historic victories of the Soviet Union "in its full-scale construction of Communism." These victories were a "brilliant confirmation" of the Soviet Union's policies and of its "Len-

inist Central Committee." Specifically, he endorsed Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence with capitalist States and "the thesis regarding the possibility of eliminating war from the life of society." He was quick to point out, however, that "ideological coexistence" was impossible, and that "the struggle against the aggressive policies of imperialism" must continue. In conclusion, the Party leader repeated the time-worn Romanian call for a "Balkan Pact" and a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, and castigated "Yugoslav revisionism" which had caused Belgrade "serious difficulties," such as a "stagnation" in agriculture. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], June 21.)

Strengthening the State apparatus is to be the primary goal of the government in the next few years, said Premier Chivu Stoica in his speech the next day. In particular, the economic sphere of government planning and operation must be improved at all levels, and in this respect Stoica referred to the decision of the December 1959 plenum on the need for a new organization to coordinate all economic activities within the various regions. Segments of the central administration also came under fire: the Ministry of Heavy Industry for manufacture of "obsolescent machinery"; the Ministry of Agriculture for bureaucratic inefficiency; the Ministry of Education for being insufficiently concerned with ideology; and the Finance Ministry for careless financial transactions. Also criticized were the mass organizations—people's councils, trade unions, working youth organizations—for falling down on the job of combatting "anti-Socialist inclinations." (*Scinteia*, June 22.)

KHRUSHCHEV REAFFIRMS COEXISTENCE

The Romanian Congress was dominated by the presence and words of Soviet Premier and Party leader Nikita Khrushchev. As soon as he arrived in the Romanian cap-

ital he announced that peaceful coexistence was to remain the keystone of his foreign policy. Speaking to newsmen at the Soviet industrial exhibition in a Bucharest park, he emphasized that "above all," he wanted peace and friendship "with all nations—with France, with Britain and with the United States." "Coexistence is the only way—the only path to take," he said. "Any other way means death and destruction for all of us." (*The New York Times*, June 20.) In his major address to the Congress he reiterated this thesis and went on to make one of the most important ideological pronouncements in recent years when he asserted that some of Lenin's theses were no longer applicable and should be reinterpreted according to present conditions.

Khrushchev began with expected praise for Romanian social, cultural and economic achievements, but he soon sounded the *leitmotif* of his speech—the necessity for unity among the Communist States in their "peaceful competition" with the West. "It is already clear to everyone that it is only through close economic and political cooperation among the countries of the world Socialist system that their successful advance toward Socialism and Communism is possible," he said. Any deviation from this road was doomed to failure, and he chose the example of Yugoslavia to illustrate this prognosis:

"It is known that the leaders of the League of Yugoslav Communists have long been denying the need for a Socialist camp, likening it to a military bloc. The Yugoslav leaders call their policy a nonbloc policy, although everyone knows . . . that they are in the so-called Balkan Pact, composed of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Thus the policy of Yugoslavia is not a nonbloc policy. Yugoslavia, through this Balkan Pact, is linked with the aggressive military blocs of NATO and CENTO."

Romanian Party leaders and delegates from "fraternal" Communist Parties at the closing session of Romania's Third Party Congress.

SCINTEIA (Bucharest), June 28, 1960



All this was familiar fare, although the tone was somewhat sharper than that of recent pronouncements of this nature. Even when Khrushchev defended his statement that "Communism will bury capitalism" by explaining that economic and ideological weapons rather than the use of physical force would suffice for this purpose, this was nothing new. But when he elaborated on the necessity for peaceful overthrow of the "capitalist regimes," he spoke with great vigor: "Communists, who are realists, are aware that under modern conditions, and with the existence of two world systems, relations between them must be built to exclude the possibility of war between States. Only madmen and maniacs can speak of a new world war."

LENIN OUTDATED

After severely criticizing the "American imperialists" who "torpedoed" the summit meeting in Paris, Khrushchev went on to define his Party's thesis that "war is not inevitable in our time" and by implication condemned the extremist Communist Chinese dogmatism. After proclaiming that "Lenin's theses on imperialism remain in force, and as before, serve and will serve as a guiding star in our theory and practice," the Soviet Premier then reinterpreted Lenin and produced his own gospel, according to which Lenin's concept that "imperialist wars are inevitable" was no longer applicable:

"But we must not forget that Lenin's theses on imperialism were put forward and developed by him years ago, when many phenomena which have become decisive for the development of the historical process and the entire international situation were absent. . . . Besides, comrades, one cannot mechanically repeat now what Vladimir Ilich Lenin said many decades ago on imperialism and go on asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until Socialism triumphs throughout the world. . . .

"History will possibly witness a time when capitalism is preserved only in a small number of States, States as small, for instance, as a button on a coat. Well, even in such a situation would one have to look in a book to see what Vladimir Ilich Lenin quite correctly said about his own time? Would one have to repeat that wars are inevitable since capitalist countries exist? . . . If Lenin could rise from his grave he would take such people, as one says, to task, and would teach them how to understand the essence of the matter. We live in a time when we have neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin with us. If we act like children, who in studying the alphabet build words out of letters, we shall not get very far. . . . On the basis of Marxism-Leninism we must think for ourselves, study life profoundly, analyze the present situation and draw conclusions which benefit the common cause of Communism. . . . All this allows us to say confidently that under present circumstances war is not inevitable. He who does not understand this does not believe in the working class' strength and creative possibilities, underestimates the might of the working class and does not believe in the great attractive force of Socialism, which has amply demonstrated its superiority over capitalism."

Much of the rest of his speech was devoted to projecting the image of a Pax Sovietica which had been forced on the "imperialists" on three occasions in recent years when war

threatened. For Soviet intervention, he continued, had put an end to the British-French-Israeli "aggression" against Egypt in 1956, prevented Turkey from attacking Syria in 1957, and kept American and British forces out of Iraq in 1958. (*Scintea*, June 22.)

The East European leaders fully adhered to Khrushchev's policy statements. The immediate reaction was blanket support for peaceful coexistence. East German Party chief Walter Ulbricht, for example, said that the balance of power now favors "the camp of peace and Socialism," thus making it possible to eliminate war from the world. In the weeks following the Bucharest conference, the Soviet Premier's revisions of Lenin were also repeated by Party and government officials. Speaking in Varna, July 3, Bulgarian Premier Anton Yugov echoed Khrushchev's words: "It would be wrong to approach Lenin's writings in a dogmatic manner. Imperialism has not changed, but conditions have. New factors have emerged which tie the hands of war-lovers and do not permit them to start a new war with impunity. The failure to see this is very wrong, for it means taking a dogmatic approach to contemporary conditions." (Radio Sofia, July 3.) Numerous editorials in East European Party organs appeared during this same period explaining and promoting Khrushchev's rethinking of Leninist teachings.

COMMUNIST CHINESE DELEGATE SPEAKS

The ideological split between Moscow and Peiping had narrowed after the summit breakdown. Then, Peiping had retreated from its hard line against "US imperialism" and admitted that "the possibility of preventing a world war" still existed, although the long Soviet article in *Pravda*, June 12, attacking "dogmatism and sectarianism" and implicitly criticizing Communist China for its program of agricultural and industrial communization, had never been printed in Peiping. (See *East Europe*, July, pp. 36-38.)

Now, China also had to cope with Khrushchev's contention that Lenin's thesis of the inevitability of war with imperialist States was outmoded. The speech of the Chinese delegate, Peng Chen, Mayor of Peiping and member of the Politburo, however, was moderate (for China) in tone, deferential to the Soviet Union, the "head of the Socialist camp." He did not make the distinction, recently voiced by Chinese General Hsiao Hua, that "just wars" are different from other wars and must be supported, but instead, echoed the Moscow Declaration of November 1957, subscribed to by all the Communist countries except Yugoslavia:

"The Declaration pointed out on the one hand that 'so long as imperialism exists there will always be soil for aggressive wars,' that the 'aggressive circles' of the United States are 'the center of world reaction' and 'the sworn enemies of the people,' and that 'all the nations must display the utmost vigilance in regard to the war danger created by imperialism.' On the other hand, the declaration pointed out that 'the forces of peace have grown so that there is a real possibility of averting war.' So long as there is unity within the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union . . . it is possible to check war and safeguard peace."

These conciliatory words were somewhat modified by his description of the nature of "imperialism":

"This is to say that the aggressive and predatory nature of imperialism will never change. US imperialism is the arch-enemy of world peace. The people in the world must never have any unrealistic illusions about imperialism, especially US imperialism. They must maintain great vigilance, carry on a persistent struggle against US imperialism and its lackeys, and maintain solidarity and mutual respect in the struggle. . . . War can be averted and world peace preserved only by continually strengthening the forces of the people in the countries of the Socialist camp, by aiding the liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the revolutionary struggle in various capitalist countries, and by relying on their alliance in the resolute struggle against US imperialism and its lackeys so as to put US imperialism in the most isolated position."

Ideologically, the Chinese Communist concentrated his fire on "revisionism," concluding his speech with a harsh denunciation of the "Tito group":

"Modern revisionists, represented by the Tito group, exactly in keeping with the needs of imperialism, are trying their best to disrupt this great unity, thus serving imperialism and especially U.S. imperialism. For the defense of the unity of the Socialist camp . . . we must carry on the struggle against modern revisionism to the end. We must thoroughly expose the features of the renegades, completely wipe away their ideological poisons, and smash all their criminal sabotage activities." (New China News Agency, June 22.)

Albanian Echoes

While paying lip service to the Soviet posture of "peaceful coexistence," the Albanian representative, Politburo member Hysni Kapo, used the vocabulary of the Communist Chinese in his speech praising the Soviet Union's "struggle for peace":

"Our Party and government are struggling for peace which is needed by all mankind, with the exception of the warmongering imperialists. Regardless of the fact that we know that war is desired and prepared for by the imperialists, we are conducting talks with them by always being vigilant, by never failing in our principles, by never making any unilateral concessions, by never endangering even for a moment the ideological and political struggle, and by constantly being interested in the great struggle for peace of all people throughout the world. . . ."

No Albanian Communist could resist blasting the Yugoslav Party on such an occasion; Kapo finished by branding the "Yugoslav revisionists" as "the enemies and traitors of Marxism-Leninism" and "vile lackeys of American imperialism." (Radio Tirana, June 22.)

PERSONNEL CHANGES

On June 26, the Congress ended after electing a new Politburo, Secretariat and Central Committee. The Politburo and Secretariat remained much the same with some minor changes. One Politburo member, Constantin Parvulescu, was dropped and replaced by the titular Head of State, Ion Gheorghe Maurer. Vladimir Gheorghiu, a member of the Secretariat, was also out and in his place Mihael



GHEORGHE GHEORGHIU-DEJ



CHIVU STOICA



GHEORGHE APOSTOL



EMIL BODNARAS



PETRE BORILA



NICOLAE CEAUDESCU



ALEXANDRU DRAGHICI



ION GHEORGHE MAURER



ALEXANDRU MOGHIOROS



DUMITRU COLUI



LEONTE RAUTU



LEONTIN SALAJAN



STEFAN VOITEC

Dalea was elected. The Central Committee was enlarged from 58 to 79 full members while the number of candidate members dropped slightly—from 34 to 31. It is worth noting that Gherasim Popa, former Minister of Heavy Industry and present Deputy Premier, was not re-elected to the Central Committee.

The composition of the new Central Committee showed a strengthening of State-Ministerial representation. Among those promoted were the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Trade, Minister of Consumer Goods Industry, Minister of Forestry Economy, Deputy Minister of Trade and Deputy Minister of Heavy Industry. Another trend was the increase of local and provincial Party representation in the Committee, and of representatives from the regional and urban people's councils.

Resolution

The Congress Resolution approved by the Romanian Party membership called for continued investment in heavy

industry, the completion of the collectivization of agriculture, an improvement in housing conditions, and "continuous increase in the consumption of food and industrial products." On the ideological plane, the Party was urged to concentrate on increasing membership, to pay "strict attention to Leninist principles and norms," and to strengthen "Party discipline" in order to "unify the Party around the Central Committee." The Congress also endorsed the principles of the international Communist movement as contained in the Moscow declaration of November 1957. (*Scinteia*, June 26.)

In a rally of 100,000 persons in Bucharest Stadium to celebrate the successful conclusion of the meeting, June 25, Soviet Premier Khrushchev again called for the "liquidation of the cold war" and the easing of international tension. At the same time he cautioned the audience to keep up their defenses against the "imperialists," and never forget that "the imperialists act like predatory beasts which can attack a person if he is not on the lookout. But if you are firm and steady, the beast will not dare attack you." (*Scinteia*, June 26.)

The Bucharest Declaration

Following the Congress the Party leaders of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Czechoslovak First Secretary Antonin Novotny and Albanian Party Secretary Enver Hoxha, met with Nikita Khrushchev. The next day the twelve ruling Parties, including the Chinese, issued a communique affirming their allegiance to the principles of the 1957 Moscow Declaration. But there were significant differences in tone between the two statements. The 1957 Declaration stressed the "peaceful overthrow" of capitalist nations; force was to be used only when the "ruling classes" resorted to violence "against the people." The new Bucharest Declaration soft-pedals this thesis, by restating it without qualifications: "It is also necessary to proceed from the possibility of the working class gaining a victory for the Socialist revolution by nonpeaceful means." Otherwise, the communique reaffirms Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence:

"The representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist countries believe that all the conclusions of the [Moscow] declaration and the manifesto of peace—on peaceful coexistence between countries with differing social systems, on the possibility of preventing wars in the present era, on the necessity of people's vigilance with regard to the danger of war since the existence of imperialism retains the ground for aggressive wars—can be fully applied in the present situation too."

In conclusion, the Parties reiterated their "unity in the struggle for peace and the security of all peoples, for the triumph of the great cause of Marxism-Leninism." (Tass, June 28.)

The modification of the Moscow Declaration by the Bucharest communique appears in the nature of a compromise between Moscow and Peiping. In return for support for his policy of "peaceful coexistence," Khrushchev has allowed the Parties to strike a more militant posture toward the "imperialists." At the same time, while enunciating his

own revision of Leninist doctrines, he has not opposed the vehemence directed by the Chinese and Albanian delegates toward "Yugoslav revisionism."

THE ECONOMY

THE INGATHERING OF Communist bloc Party leaders headed by Soviet Premier Khrushchev served to overshadow much of the announced purpose of the Congress, which was to appraise the Romanian Party's achievements since the last Congress in 1955 and to approve the economic directives for the Six Year Plan (1960-1965) and the prospectus for economic development until 1975. For the Romanian people, these were the important features. In a five-hour opening address, the First Party Secretary hailed the achievements of the past four and a half years and called for a program of rapid industrial growth which will mean plenty of hard work and sacrifices during the next fifteen years for his 18.3 million countrymen.

The facts and figures with which Gheorghiu-Dej studded his record of the past years were impressive. Judging from the economy's performance during the first five months of this year, he said, total industrial production will have climbed 67 percent above the 1955 level by the end of 1960—the last year of the Second Five Year Plan. This figure compares with a target of only 60-65 percent, or an average annual growth rate of 9.9-10.5 percent, planned for the period. The production of capital goods is expected to be 86 percent larger than in 1955, instead of the 77 percent envisaged in the Plan. Moreover, Gheorghiu-Dej asserted, "deep social and economic changes have taken place . . . in village life;" more than 81 percent of the country's arable land and about the same percentage of peasant farms are now inside the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. Further evidence of success was found in the expansion of the population's purchasing power, said to be reflected by a 50 percent increase in the volume of retail trade. National income had risen by some 40 percent.

Behind the global indicators, Gheorghiu-Dej sought more tangible justification for the hard road which he and his Party comrades had selected for the country to travel in the coming years. Several industrial branches, he noted, had reached or surpassed the planned targets by the close of 1959, i.e., in four rather than in five years. Among these were the machine and equipment building industries and the chemical industry: output from the machine-building industry had doubled since 1955 and production in the chemical industry had grown by 130 percent during the same period. In the years 1956-1959, he said, 101 new enterprises and 93 new sections were constructed, and 294 enterprises were reequipped. Labor productivity had risen by an average of more than 8 percent, an improvement said to be responsible for more than two-thirds of the total increase in industrial output. Production costs were cut by 12 percent in the first four years of the Plan. As a result of these achievements, the Party leader concluded: "Our country has made a giant step forward in its economic and social development, thus creating prerequisites for its constant progress at an even higher rate."

An Uneven Record

But the bombast and the spurious arithmetic could not obscure the fact that Romania is still an underdeveloped country. Many industries are just emerging, or are still in the early stages of development, and variations in output from year to year are often enormous. Steel production, for example, grew by 52 percent in 1959 as compared with an increase of 7.8 percent the previous year. (See Facts and Figures, p. 10.) Moreover, the development of the economy has been subject to policy shifts by the Communist leadership in response to domestic and international political forces. At the outset of the Second Five Year Plan, promulgated in 1955, emphasis had been placed on the

rapid development of heavy industry—particularly the metallurgical, fuel, chemical and machine-building industries. However, this new drive to turn the country into a land of iron and steel had to be slowed down after the Hungarian Revolt and the Polish "October" in 1956. More funds were channeled into the countryside and the production of consumer goods was stepped up (in 1958 this sector actually grew faster than heavy industry). The next "turning point" came in 1958, coinciding with a general program of economic acceleration in most of the countries of Eastern Europe. Investments rose in 1959, and in 1960 the planned outlay of funds was hiked by another third. Metallurgy, machine-building and the chemical industries have absorbed increasingly larger shares of total investment and achieved the highest rates of growth. The rapid expansion of these industries is also partly explained by the fact that they are new: each additional plant installation yields a huge percentage increase in total production. At the same time, these industries have received the largest credits from the Soviet Union.

Other industries have not done as well. Crude oil, pig iron, methane gas, soda and cement are considerably behind their targets. The most serious lag has been in the consumer-goods sector, despite the efforts of the past two and a half years.

The main reason for these disparities has been the shortage of investment funds. Gheorghiu-Dej told the Congress that, by the end of 1960, about 84 billion *lei* will have been invested in the national economy—a figure which is more than 20 percent short of the target set in 1955. The planners have been repeatedly scored for failing to "mobilize reserves" and for "not taking into account the fact that an increase of production can be obtained not only through investments but also by using the full capacity of each enterprise."

Although the lack of balance in the country's development has caused the planners some concern, it has not dampened the Party's enthusiasm for pushing on at even higher rates of growth. Confusion in developing a well-rounded and consistent plan was evidently one of the reasons for delaying the Party Congress well into the middle of the first year of the new planning period, six months after the deadline set by Party statutes. Planning has been complicated by the need to coordinate the Romanian economy with the rest of the Soviet bloc under the policies of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which is attempting to introduce a division of labor among the industries of the Satellite countries.

THE NEW SIX YEAR PLAN

THE SIX YEAR PLAN (1960-1965) approved by the Party Congress is a Five Year Plan incorporating the final year of the previous Plan, 1960, as its starting point. This move was evidently in deference to Comecon's efforts to synchronize planning and to dovetail the long-range economic targets within the Soviet bloc. The theme of the new Plan is to "complete the main phase of Socialist building by



A new apartment house on the Dimbovia embankment in Bucharest.
RUMANIA TODAY (Bucharest), No. 1, 1960

1965." The central goals are: "to continue at a sustained rate with industrialization . . . giving priority to heavy industry and the key machine-building industry," and "to complete the collectivization of agriculture." In order to achieve these objectives, the regime has provided for a volume of investment which is some 40 percent more than the total amount invested in the last 10 years.

Industrial production is to increase about 110 percent by 1965, or roughly 13 percent annually, as compared with the level of 1959. The goal for agricultural output is a 9.3-10.3 percent annual rate of growth, or a total of about 70-80 percent for the duration of the Plan. Although heavy industry is to grow by 120 percent, a relatively rapid rise in the consumer sector is also anticipated (100 percent). The light industries are to grow by 110 percent and the food industries by 100 percent.

The most ambitious part of the Plan is the investment necessary to carry it out. The proposed outlay of 170-180 billion *lei* is approximately double the amount spent on the national economy during the preceding six years. (See Facts and Figures.) Of the 59 percent slated for industry, three-fourths is earmarked for the "decisive branches of heavy industry": power, metallurgy, machine-building and chemicals. However, the larger part of the investment will go to completing projects already under way and to the reconstruction of existing facilities. Over half of the total increase in industrial production by 1965 must be achieved with existing capacity, 30 percent through the development of existing enterprises and only about 18 percent from the new plants commissioned during the planned period.

In agriculture, the planned investment in 1960-1965 will be roughly double the amount invested in the preceding six years, although in percentage terms it will be less than in 1957-1959. However, there will be larger investments in chemical fertilizers, tractors and other agricultural machinery, the production of which is technically in the industrial sector. In addition to the 23 billion *lei* provided for agriculture from State funds, 11 billion *lei* are to be invested by the peasants and collective farms from their own resources.

Despite the emphasis on larger investments, more than 70 percent of the growth in industrial output is to come from increased efficiency rather than a larger working force. Labor productivity (output per man-year in Communist terms) is slated to increase by 60-65 percent. Thus the success of the Plan will hinge on the regime's success in improving the organization of work and in getting new techniques adopted in the factories.

National income is slated to grow by 70-80 percent. The consumption fund will expand by 60-70 percent as compared with the previous six year period and is said to represent about three-quarters of national income; this means that roughly 25 percent of the country's productive efforts will be allocated to accumulation. Real wages of the workers are to improve by about 40-45 percent as compared with the second half of 1959, and the income of the peasantry is to increase by roughly 40 percent. The Plan calls for the construction of about 300,000 apartments, or three times the



The new ammonium nitrate plant at the Fagaras Chemical Combine.
RUMANIA TODAY (Bucharest), No. 3, 1960

number realized in the preceding six years. State-run retail trade will handle twice the quantity of goods in 1965 that it did in 1959. The volume of foreign trade is slated to grow by the same percentage.

The Years Beyond

The long-range program for economic development to 1975, outlined by Party leader Gheorghiu-Dej at the Congress, follows the pattern of growth in the Six Year Plan. "The powerful upsurge," said Gheorghiu-Dej, "will be determined by the preferential growth of heavy industry and its leading branch, machine-building—the fundamental prerequisite for the uninterrupted development of the national economy." Some of the targets:

Industrial production in 1975 will be more than 6 times
(Continued on page 17)

Facts and Figures

Romania's Industrial Development

The Third Party Congress which met in Bucharest in June (see the article beginning on page 3) was chiefly devoted to discussing the economic program for the years 1960-1965. In this section we give some of the economic and statistical details.

THE MAIN LINES of industrial development contained in the new Plan emphasize Romanian specialties. The chemical industry is to continue its rapid progress, growing by 230 percent during the period. According to First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej, large combines are now being

built in various sections of the country, including a new petro-chemical complex at Ploesti, expansion of the one at Borzisti and a new artificial fiber combine at Savinesti. These plants will produce a variety of goods ranging from sulfuric acid to synthetic rubber and cellulose. The output of chemical fertilizers, of primary importance to the rural sector, is slated to be roughly 9.5 times the 1959 level by the end of the period.

The stress on the chemical industry will add new dimensions to the country's traditional petroleum industry, since it is one of the principle sources of raw material. While the

THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

	1950	1955	1959	1960 as planned in 1956	1965 plan	Percentage increase 1959 to 1965
Coal (million tons)	3.9	6.1	8.0	11.0-11.6	11.5-12.5	44-57
Iron ore	0.4	0.6	1.1	1.15-1.25	4.0	280
Pig iron	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.1	2.0	136
Steel	0.6	0.8	1.4	1.5-1.7	3.3	133
Rolled steel	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.05-1.07	2.5	143
Crude oil	5.0	10.6	11.4	13.5	12.2	7
Coke (thousand tons)	72	144	609	700	1,600	163
Natural gas (million cubic meters)	1,950	3,952	5,782	9,327	13,300	130
Electric power (billion kwh)	2.1	4.3	6.8	7.8-8.0	18.5	171
Electric motors (megawatts)	94	147	467	370-400	1,100	136
Freight cars (units)	2,092	1,457	3,584	2,914	6,000	67
Tractors	3,468	3,500	8,008	6,000	16,000	100
Calcined and caustic soda (thousand tons)	54	75	171	291	500	192
Chemical fertilizers	0.6	11	52	45	500	862
Plastics	—	—	5.8	6.3	95	1538
Synthetic fibers and yarns	—	—	0.3	7.0	13	4233
Cement	1,028	1,936	2,850	3,583	6,500	128
Radio sets (thousand)	40	89	167	148	300	80
Bicycles	—	35	157	107	450	187
Footwear (million pairs)	11	18	28	26	45	60
Meat (thousand tons)	140	221	241	365	610	153
Sugar	87	130	242	280	460	90

Sources: Scinteia (Bucharest), December 24, 1955, May 19, 1960 and June 21, 1960; Anuarul Statistic (Bucharest), 1959; United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe (Geneva), November 1959, p. A-13.

target for crude oil production is below the level it was expected to reach in 1960, stress is now being placed on processing and refining, along with an expansion of natural gas production. The reason for the shift, in addition to the requirements of the chemical industry, is the pinch in oil reserves available for extraction. Although the depletion of reserves is not as serious as once predicted, further production increases will require extensive exploration and development of new fields. Gheorghiu-Dej stated at the Congress that the main task of the petroleum industry during the Six Year Plan is to increase crude oil reserves.

The machine-building industry, described as "pivotal" to the progress of the economy, is to raise its output 120 percent by 1965. Mass production is to be pushed, "taking into account the economic advantages of specialization and cooperation with the other Socialist countries." The main production lines to be developed, according to the Plan, are oil drilling installations, chemical and oil refinery equipment, diesel-electric engines, ships, building industry equipment, machine tools, trucks, tractors and other agricultural machinery.

A huge new iron and steel center, which in its final stage of development will have a capacity of 4 million tons of steel annually, is to be constructed during the next 10 years at Galati. During the course of the Six Year Plan, over 4 billion lei will be invested in this major project or more than one-third of the funds earmarked for the whole iron and steel industry. The location of the project at a port city near the mouth of the Danube will give it access to raw materials from the Soviet Union, as well as to the iron ore recently discovered in the Constanta region to the south. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, the USSR will supply "significant quantities" of coking coal, metallurgical coke and iron ore to the combine; the USSR will also supply Romania with increasing amounts of pig iron, reaching some 390,000 tons in 1965 and 1.1 million tons in 1970.

CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT

	Planned			
	1956-1960	1960	1960-1965	
Total (billions of lei)	105-110	23.5	170-180	
Percent going to:				
Industry	56	59	59	
Capital goods	50	—	48	
Fuel and power	44.5	39	32	
Metallurgy and machine-building	23	19	23	
Chemical	13	22	20	
Consumer goods	6	—	6.5	
Agriculture	12.5	18.7	13	
Transport and telecommunications	11.5	—	9	
Social and Cultural	9.5	—	11	
	Realized			
	1956	1957	1958	1959
Total (billions of lei)	14.8	13.7	14.9	17.5
Percent going to:				
Industry	56.7	53.9	53.6	53.9
Capital goods	50.0	48.3	47.8	48.5
Fuel and power	44.6	44.0	40.4	—
Metallurgy and machine-building	24	24	23	—
Chemical	9.5	11.2	16	20
Consumer goods	6.7	5.6	5.7	5.4
Agriculture	11.0	13.4	17.2	18.5

Sources: *Anuarul Statistic* (Bucharest), 1959; *Scinteia* (Bucharest), December 24, 1955, May 19, 1960 and June 21, 1960.

THE MINDS OF THE YOUNG

The results of an opinion survey made among Polish young people between the ages of 15 and 24, based on replies from 2,746 of those queried:

"Only 12 percent of those who replied have defined political views. 21.2 percent consider themselves democrats, but this term is used in a very loose way. 27.9 percent declare that they have no ties to any political current whatsoever, but approve of the political reality in Poland. 38.8 percent have no political views.

"82.6 percent of the respondents say they have strong convictions on religious matters; of these, 78.3 percent declare themselves Catholics and 4.3 percent are athe-

ists. 5.3 percent say they 'are not interested in these matters,' and 11.9 percent that they have no views. . . .

"Following are the replies to the question 'What in your opinion is the most important problem in Poland now?': Improvement in public honesty, 30.2 percent; the struggle against alcoholism, 14.3 percent; industrialization, 13.4 percent; better education and the propagation of culture, 8.5 percent; an increase in labor efficiency, 7.7 percent; birth control, 6.8 percent; foreign assistance, 6.3 percent; the general democratization of life, 5.8 percent; more obedience to the government, 5.4 percent; no response, 1.9 percent."

Polityka (Warsaw), June 18, 1960

Politics in the Czechoslovak Theater

AMONG THE HIT PLAYS running in Prague last winter were Arthur Miller's "Death of a Salesman" and "A View from the Bridge," John Osborne's "The Entertainer" and Friedrich Durrenmatt's "The Visit." These were only a few of the many Western imports, ranging from "Arsenic and Old Lace" to the songs of Harry Belafonte, which played to enthusiastic audiences in the city's 22 theaters. This manifest popularity of things Western is ironic in a country ruled by some of the stodgiest and most conservative Communists in the Soviet bloc. But the dullness that characterizes so much of life in Czechoslovakia today has been spared the theater. While the imported plays are not anti-Communist in the narrow political sense, they present a range of attitudes which do not always conform to the orthodox Marxist view of life. Moreover, the performance of Western works is not the only way in which the stage has resisted the more dogmatic claims of "Socialist realism." While actors and directors are not free to produce whatever they please, they have found ways to smuggle into their art various ideas and moods that are not native to the Communist ideology.

A Tradition of Rebellion

Not only today, but throughout modern times, the theater has held a position of particular importance in Czechoslovak life. Along with written literature it has been a staunch protagonist of Czech and Slovak nationalism, especially during the national renaissance in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the early days wandering theatrical groups helped to create a native literary consciousness among the peasants and small-town bourgeoisie. At a time when German was the only socially acceptable language in the former Kingdom of Bohemia, the "small Czech men" throughout the country made heroic efforts to collect money to build the National Theater in Prague. Thus the stage became an important part of Czechoslovak history, in the political as well as the artistic sense.

This national political tradition is still alive, despite twelve years of Communist emphasis on an anti-bourgeois, anti-modernistic, "Socialist-realist" theater. One reason for its vitality is the avant-garde movement that flourished between the two world wars and has a lingering influence

even today. The movement produced a number of brilliant theater groups—The Seven of Hearts (Cervena Sedma), Czech Avant-Garde, Devetsil, The Liberated Theater, Artistic Studio and D-34—covering a range from political satire to modernistic stage techniques. Their most pronounced characteristic was an emphasis on creative freedom in staging, and they were considerably influenced by Russian and German expressionists like Tairov, Meierhold, Okhlopkov, Reinhardt and Piscator.

Some of the avant-garde were leftist or "progressive" in their politics: for example, the "Liberated Theater" of Jan Werich and Jiri Voskovec, and the "D-34" of E. F. Burian. These groups, along with the young political poets, carried on a running social criticism "in the name of the poor and humiliated." But they were also anti-authoritarian in their outlook, and set a tradition of freedom in both art and politics that did not quite fit the Communist sympathies of some of their leaders. When the Communists took over Czechoslovakia, the avant-garde found itself in a predicament: to be against the dictatorship in the name of freedom, or for the dictatorship in the name of the poor and humiliated. The most notable figure among them was E. F. Burian, a director, writer, actor and composer who had joined the Communist Party in 1923 and remained a faithful Party member until his death in August 1959. When the Party imposed the cultural straitjacket of Zhdanovism in 1948 he exchanged his prewar experimentalism for "Socialist realism." In 1957, however, during the brief cultural thaw that followed the Soviet Twentieth Congress, he expressed the feelings of many Communist artists when he wrote:

"The D-34 Theater was liberated for the first time in 1945 from the clutches of Fascism . . . our working people liberated it for the second time in 1948 from the remnants of reaction. The third liberation came in 1956 under the rejuvenating influence of the Twentieth Congress . . . which confirmed that the evolutionary tendency of D-34 had been sound—a tendency which, under the frequently hard conditions of former years, had to fight its way through a labyrinth of phrases and careerism."¹

But the Party hierarchs in Czechoslovakia were old Stalinists; they refused to give in to the more liberal ideas that

won a partial victory in neighboring Poland. They fought to preserve their orthodox "Socialist realism." Burian, acting as a spokesman for the liberals, argued that it was not a political question at all but a new round in the old struggle between the avant-garde and the conservatives:

"There has been a great fight raging on our theatrical front, a fight that began not in 1945 but rather in the Twenties when Devetsil, Czech Avant-Garde, and later the Liberated Theater, Artistic Studio and others began their work. The conflict has been here ever since, and to us it now understandably seems to have taken new forms."

Arguing against those Communists who thought the theater began only after the Party had attained power, he insisted "that we were not born in 1945, that we have a real tradition."²

The director of the Olomouc Theater, Karel Novak, made a similar plea for the Czech tradition in 1958. "We will not help ourselves," he argued, "by insisting on a one-sided dogmatic interpretation of Socialist realism. The Czech theater has its tradition."^{2a} But the Party officials held to their old position that "Socialist realism" could mean only a positive portrayal of life in Czechoslovakia, and that the purpose of art was to educate a "new Socialist man"—in short, the dogmatic framework from which the playwrights and producers had hoped to escape. "Some of our theater workers," said one regime voice, "still stick to their errors and want to see the Socialist world walk in the direction they tried to impose upon it immediately after the Twentieth Congress. One of these tendencies is the endeavor to surrender the social-educational role of the theater. It is no secret that many Communist artists have committed serious errors."³

Art and the Censor

The clash between art and dogma in the Czechoslovak theater has led to several interesting consequences. First, the old avant-garde has visibly weakened in the past several years. Second, frustrated play producers have turned to the classical drama to find an acceptable way of expressing feelings and ideas that cannot be put in contemporary form—with the result that a kind of "symbolic" theater has grown up under the noses of the official censors. Third, the suppression of genuine modern drama has been accompanied by an increased production of modern plays from the West.

The avant-garde suffered a heavy loss with the death of E. F. Burian, who was almost the only Communist playwright and producer who really tried to inject some art into the canon of "Socialist realism" and to create modern plays dealing with contemporary problems. In 1958 and 1959 his D-34 Theater presented a number of plays—some of them his own—which apparently were not well-received by the audiences. According to one newspaper critic, the theater had been forced to conceal the emptiness of its house by curtaining off a portion of the auditorium. The critic attacked Burian for "tossing off one original contemporary play after another this season, in the hope that quantity will necessarily turn into quality." The failure of the plays, he said, could not be blamed on "the snobbishness of audiences or the grudges of critics."⁴



Jiri Vala as Eugene in the Czech adaptation of "Look Homeward Angel." In the background is Vladimir Smeral, who plays his father.

Photograph from CZECHOSLOVAK LIFE (Prague), January 1959

One D-34 play, "What Do You Live For, Vaclav Riha?" survived the criticism and is still among current listings. The reason is unmistakably its very contemporary theme; it is a "story of an honest man, Vaclav Riha, who lived in forced seclusion for ten years because careerist intrigues had deprived him of any chance to work, and who is rehabilitated on his seventieth birthday." The play "makes the audience feel sorry for the old man," said one critic. "If this play intended to point to Riha's case as one which may happen even in our society, it certainly succeeded."⁵

As for the young playwrights, some have had the courage to tackle delicate topics. An article in a leading literary magazine, discussing some of the new plays produced in 1956, commented: "Our drama of late years created a glass wall between the stage and the audience in that it succumbed to the general tendency to distort reality in the interest of promoting the development of a new social order. . . . One of the happiest features of last year's dramatic crop is the fact that the playwrights have found the guts to face reality." The article praised a play by Milan Jariš—"The Intellectuals"—as "the first play which courageously passes a judgment on some mistakes, or rather on crimes, of our daily civil life. Yes, on crimes, since there is no other name for

those fateful cases when political hatred . . . robs a neighbor of his basic civil rights." The key figure in this play was a Mrs. Kalista, M. D. "Because her husband has been arrested for political reasons," the article said, "she—although a Party member—is driven to suicide, hounded to death by mistrust, suspicion and despair."⁶

The Decline of Talent

About a year later, another young playwright, Pavel Kohout, had his "September Nights" staged in Prague. The Communist author aimed his shafts at stupid, Stalinist types of army officers—after first getting approval from the military authorities. The performance apparently won much applause from audiences hostile to Communism itself, as the playwright later admitted. "It is natural," he wrote, "that there are even reactionaries and scoundrels [in the audiences] who come just to applaud the criticisms of our Army, expressed in a few of the lines, but I think every honest and normal person must understand what the author had in mind."⁷

The year 1958 was, on the whole, the high point of gen-

uine, modern social drama in Czechoslovakia under the Communist regime. Since then the vitality of the movement has wilted under the new ideological restrictions imposed by the authorities. The way these restrictions work was shown by the results of a contest for new contemporary plays held in Prague in 1958. Some of the most prominent playwrights took part, but the judges failed to award either a first or a second prize on the ground that the artistic and technical level of the 182 plays submitted was too low. About 70 percent of the entries dealt with family and domestic conflicts. Another 20 percent were on the subject of "the problems of young people, most of which were attributed to drinking. . . . More attention was directed to the errors of disturbed youth than to youth taking an active part in . . . the successes of our economic struggle. . . . Generally interesting problems were described by female pens which on paper threatened selfish husbands, described their own exhaustion from overwork, and tried to prove that men should be re-educated." A large number of the plays dealt with international politics, but many of them were said to have shown conspicuous ignorance of the situation in capitalist countries. Implausible milieus, poor use of language and insufficient grasp of psychology and of the laws of dramatic construction, together with an excess of "exterior ideology," were among the other criticisms.⁸

Flight to the Symbolic

Most producers and directors do not want to take the risks involved in promoting contemporary social drama. Instead, they express themselves by staging classical plays—ranging from Euripides to nineteenth century Czech playwrights—in settings which give them an implicit message for contemporary audiences. For example, "Romeo and Juliet" becomes a study in the Communist regimentation of young people. "Macbeth," in one recent production, had strong overtones suggesting the career of Stalin. One critic compared it with another production that appeared in 1939 under the Nazi occupation. "At that time the motif of struggle against tyranny and terror sounded full." In the new presentation, he wrote, "It is a tragedy of a leader, first beloved and deified, then damned and hated. It is a tragedy of a valued member of society who changes into an egotist, tyrant, bloody dictator, mass murderer. [The director] stages 'Macbeth' as a play about crime and punishment; with almost the passion of Dostoevski he analyzes the soul of a great criminal."⁹

A minor scandal occurred in 1957 when the National Theater in Prague produced Mozart's "The Magic Flute." The struggle between light and darkness was expressed in contemporary ideological terms by the stage setting, which employed "the towers of concentration camps, giant cages containing ballet dancers, and an assortment of lights, lanterns and searchlights."¹⁰ The motif of concentration camps and prisons is rather frequent. One example was another National Theater production, Leos Janacek's opera "From the House of the Dead." A reviewer wrote: "The structure of the play and its main idea is . . . the eternal human desire for freedom." The longing for freedom was



Scene from "Arsenic and Old Lace," staged at Prague's ABC Theater. The tremendously popular comedy attracted about 90,000 viewers.

Photograph from CZECHOSLOVAK LIFE (Prague), January 1959

dramatized in a setting of "prisoners surrounded by a solid wall, a gate that opens more frequently for those coming in than for those going out, and a column of prisoners in torn uniforms and with torn souls. A remarkable gallery of human types: man as prisoner, as informer, as penitent, as coward, as tyrant and despot, as leader and as a thoughtless tool of those in power."¹¹

To give another example, in November 1958 the National Theater presented an old Czech play, "The Bagpiper of Strakonice," by J. K. Tyl. The original play portrayed poor but happy people of the Czech countryside in the middle of the last century, whom the Bagpiper leaves to journey through foreign countries. But the Prague producer made the play contemporary in a remarkable way: he changed the Bagpiper into a present-day artist-intellectual who leaves his country "fully conscious of the reasons," among which apparently is the impossibility of self-expression. "Evil forces surround man in this play, they tie his hands all the time, they make their presence felt so that people live in constant fear and horror of the omnipresent evil," wrote a surprised reviewer.¹² "Our people's optimistic attitude toward life . . . has gone." While the Bagpiper wanders in the world, the reviewer wrote, the domestic scene is pictured by "suggestive episodes of prison, or by the well-drawn scene beneath a gallows." The original play included these things also, but the reviewer complained that "these various means of expression deliberately ignore the beauty of our motherland, which along with its people calls upon the wandering man abroad to return home. On the contrary, the countryside appears as a sad deserted land and constant twilight."

Modernism: A "Contagious Fever"

To make up for the lack of contemporary themes in their theaters, the Czechoslovaks have been importing plays from the West. The majority are by "progressive," socially-conscious authors like Arthur Miller, John Osborne and Langston Hughes. But they are received with considerable misgivings by the orthodox critics. While their plays are said to show the inherent conflicts in Western bourgeois society, the authors fail to produce the right conclusions; they merely state the facts, without calling for a change in the system. The repertory of Western plays came under fire last year during a campaign to "complete the Socialist revolution in culture." One critic in Bratislava wrote:¹³

"In the period after 1948 there was a certain amount of system in the selection of programs. First we looked

EYES ACROSS THE FOOTLIGHTS

The population of Czechoslovakia is about 13.6 million. In 1958 there were 76 permanent theaters housing 106 professional ensembles; they gave 716 premieres and a total of 27,869 performances. The number of playgoers exceeded 12.5 million.



The Czech cast of Lester Cole's "The Blossom and the Root," a play about the old South, meets the American dramatist (wearing tie).

Photograph from CZECHOSLOVAK LIFE (Prague), November 1959

for domestic plays, both new and classical, then we added good plays from Soviet literature, some from the People's Democratic countries, and—very rarely—some examples of the new Western works. However, in the past two years the latter have been gaining over everything else, and certain critics have been defending and promoting them with quite a lot of verve. Western plays have flooded our theaters. The critics have begun to praise 'modernism' although nobody has been able to discover what they really mean by that. . . .

"This contagious fever of 'modernism,' these hymns to modern Western works and this meditated attempt to discredit all Eastern works, have caused a lot of harm and have flooded our state with unsuitable works from the West. . . . For two years some of our critics have been working to discredit the whole Slovak stage and to discredit our well-tested workers. For tactical reasons, these critics encourage the cult of just one trend, elevate it in order to suppress everything else. . . . [Thus] J. Bobok declared in a debate on September 30, 1958: 'If we look at the world stage we can recognize two trends. The first is that of Bertold Brecht . . . etc., the second is American or Swiss.' I could hardly believe my ears."

The critic for the official Party newspaper *Rude Pravo* complained that the majority of Western plays staged in Prague were "progressive" only in terms of the authors' cultural environment, and that when transplanted to a "Socialist" environment they became politically dangerous.¹⁴

"Prague theaters stage, for instance, numerous effective plays with anti-war themes. But their ideological slant is pacifism, opposition to war in general. . . . Is this a satisfactory view? Does it represent fully the meaning of our effort, our basic aim? In our present society not even an artistic portrayal of a fight against war can be separated from the struggle for Socialism. They are inseparable. . . .

"The angry indignation in John Osborne's 'The Entertainer' at the spiritual and material poverty created by

contemporary capitalism is certainly nobly human. So is Arthur Miller's tragic view, or the social compassion of De Filippo. These and other authors, however, cannot express more than their disagreement with the given state of affairs; they are unable to see a way out. True, they are close to our way of thinking, but they can hardly make our audiences more politically active and better fit to solve these problems. It is not right, therefore, if these plays become the main events of the season, if they attract the most attention, or if, at some time, they even become the basis for an artistic program. . . . From a general agreement on democratic, universal ideas, from a general opposition to war . . . it is necessary to go over to a Socialist offensive—in a more consistent, purposeful and decisive manner."

But the animadversions of Party critics can do little to change the tastes of Czechoslovak playgoers, who are more stubborn in their ways than the avant-garde writers ever were—and much more powerful. The box office cannot be ignored even in Czechoslovakia, and when 90,000 people queue up in one season to see "Arsenic and Old Lace," or when Prague's two light opera theaters draw more than 550,000, the custodians of Communist culture can only put down their pens and sigh. "Almost all the plays staged in Prague theaters," wrote one, ". . . could very well have

been performed in the time of the bourgeois Republic."¹⁵ While the indigenous Czechoslovak theater has been nearly extinguished by the crush of politics, the audience has regained a franchise in the theater which was denied it under Stalinism.

SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

- ¹ *DIVADLO* (Prague), April 1957
- ² *KULTURA* (Prague), October 24, 1957
- ^{2a} *KULTURA*, April 24, 1958
- ³ *PRACA* (Bratislava), December 5, 1958
- ⁴ *MLADA FRONTA* (Prague), March 17, 1959
- ⁵ *RUDE PRAVO* (Prague), November 3, 1958
- ⁶ *NOVY ZIVOT* (Prague), February 1957
- ⁷ *KULTURA*, March 27, 1958
- ⁸ *KULTURA*, July 24, 1958
- ⁹ *KULTURNY ZIVOT* (Bratislava), February 7, 1959
- ¹⁰ *PRACE* (Prague), January 20, 1957
- ¹¹ *MLADA FRONTA*, May 21, 1958
- ¹² *RUDE PRAVO*, November 25, 1958
- ¹³ *KULTURNY ZIVOT*, April 5, 1959
- ¹⁴ *RUDE PRAVO*, March 20, 1959
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*

THE POLITICALLY INDIFFERENT

"Political indifference . . . is most harmful for the proletariat and for the working people. This is just as true under capitalism as under Socialism.

"But political indifference under Socialism is, in a certain sense, even more harmful. . . . As a result of the liquidation of the political power formerly held by the bourgeoisie, and of the legal platform for disseminating bourgeois ideology, political indifference is becoming one of the main obstacles to the active participation in politics of some of the working people.

"In building Socialism, remnants of bourgeois politicking assume the form of political indifference. . . . Therefore we encounter this form of bourgeois political indifference . . . in the case of members of the former exploiting classes who express, in this way, their passive resistance to the workers' rule.

"A much more frequent form of bourgeois political indifference, especially at the beginning of Socialism, is the disguised rejection of Socialist policies outwardly camouflaged by formal acceptance. This form, characteristic of people with petty-bourgeois thinking, is marked by the opportunistic slogan: 'Let's swim with the tide.' The adherent of this philosophy reflects, 'It won't

do me any harm to come forward with some political phrases from time to time.' And cleverly (after all, this is his second nature) he now comes out with some title of a pamphlet he has read and he 'casually' drops a remark about the importance of Marxism-Leninism, and thus he is often able to bamboozle trusting Communists.

"An equally harmful form of political indifference is the sincere, but actually only outward, formal acceptance of Communist political activity. . . . This is characteristic of the so-called specialist type of political indifference, marked by a separation of social activity into watertight compartments: on one hand the 'purely' specialist, and on the other hand the political, aspect of a matter. . . .

"Talk with a man at work and he will seem to be an assiduous, conscientious and good worker. . . . But try to turn the talk to political work. Frequently you get a reply that hurts: 'Politics? Let somebody else take that up; I have my hands full and the work I finish is good, so why should I bother with people after my work is over? I have enough to do at home as it is. Let everybody do his work honestly, that is more useful politics.' "

Excerpts from an article in *Pravda* (Bratislava), April 28, 1960

(Continued from page 9)

the 1959 level, growing at an average annual rate of about 12 percent.

Steel production in 1970 will have reached 7.5 million tons.

By 1975, the machine-building industry will have increased its output by 600 percent as compared with 1959; the chemical industry will have expanded by 13 to 14 times; and electrical power is expected to reach a production of 69-70 million kilowatt-hours.

The food industry is slated to expand production by 4.5 to 5 times, and light industry 6 to 7 times.

With reference to agriculture, Gheorghiu-Dej said: "Relying on a developed industry, capable of delivering the necessary machinery, fertilizers, and other means on time, our Socialist agriculture will be able to almost triple production. There will be about 150,000 tractors in the fields, as well as other modern agricultural machines."

The central goal of the program: "catch up" with the more advanced countries by turning Romania into a well developed industrial country in the next 10 to 15 years.

AGRICULTURE: ROMANIA'S BASIS

THE ATTENTION GIVEN TO industrial development at the Congress seemed almost to overlook one basic fact of Romanian economic life: the country still has an underdeveloped agricultural economy with more than two-thirds of the labor force engaged in producing the food and fiber necessary to feed and clothe the population. The more highly developed nations of the West modernized and mechanized their agriculture a number of years ago and for some time have produced more than enough to feed their swelling urban populations with only a fraction of the manpower which most Communist countries require. Communist planners find the answer to the agricultural problem in collective farming, accompanied by mechanization and improved techniques. But this answer has not yet been accepted by the Romanian peasantry.

Nearly the first words Gheorghiu-Dej had to say on the subject of agriculture at the Party Congress were to extol the recent successes in the "Socialist transformation" of the countryside. The "Socialist sector," he said, now comprises 81 percent of the country's arable land and roughly the same percentage of peasant farms; and by 1965, he added, "it can be envisaged that the process of collectivization of agriculture will be completed. . . ." The difficulty in Romania is that the "Socialist sector" does not include a very large number of collective farms. After the initial failure of collectivization in the early 1950s, the regime instituted a system of loose-knit "agricultural associations" which are far removed from true collective farms, but are regarded as a preliminary stage in collectivization. At the beginning of this year roughly 24 percent of the arable land in the "Socialist sector" was encompassed by these preliminary organizations. The regime has been reticent as to the number of real collectives, and Gheorghiu-Dej gave no figures for them at the Congress. He did note, however, that during 1959 and in the first five months of this year, 2,516 "associations" with a total of 1,026,000 hectares were changed

into collective farms. This indicates that the drive to collectivize—in the true sense of the word—is being pushed harder than in the past.

Out of the Rut?

By 1965, approximately 100,000 tractors will be operating in the countryside—one for every 247 acres of arable land—as compared with only about 35,000 during 1959. The use of other agricultural machinery is also to be expanded considerably. The target for the application of chemical fertilizers is 2 million tons, or 8 times more than in 1959. Other basic improvements include reclaiming about one million hectares of land (one hectare equals 2.47 acres) and irrigating at least another 800,000 hectares.

Attention is to be especially concentrated on improvements in animal husbandry. The development of this branch of agriculture has suffered a stagnation familiar to most of the countries of Eastern Europe. Numbers of the various types of livestock during the 1950s and the targets for 1965 are shown in the following table (in thousands of head):*

	1951	1955	1958	1959	1965
Cattle	4,502	4,630	4,470	4,394	5,800
Cows	2,200	1,914	1,943	2,137	2,900
Pigs	2,197	4,370	3,249	4,008	7,500
Sheep	10,222	10,882	10,374	10,662	13,000
Poultry	17,610	29,500	35,000	35,000

As a basis for developing future livestock production, the area sown in corn is to be increased to more than 40 percent of the country's cultivable land; and by 1965 output of this important fodder crop is expected to be 8 or 9 million tons. Romania's grain production has in recent years fallen far short of the high targets set by the planners. The unreality of those targets is underscored by the new Plan, which sets the goal for 1965 at the level originally forecast for 1960. The figures are as follows, in thousands of tons:**

1951	7,816	1958	7,293
1955	9,956	1959	"over 11,000"
1956	7,139	1960 (Plan)	15,000
1957	11,042	1965 (Plan)	14,000-16,000

More ambitious increases are planned in the production of such items as meat, milk, edible oils and sugar, which are to grow well above the national average for the agricultural sector. Under the long-range program extending to 1975, there are to be huge increases in the number of tractors and other agricultural machinery and in the use of chemical fertilizers (5-6 million tons), the reclamation of land is to be completed, and about 2 million hectares of land are to be brought under irrigation. A three-fold increase in total agricultural production calls for 20-22 million tons of grain in 1975 and a four-fold expansion in livestock production.

* *Anuarul Statistic* (Bucharest), 1959; *Scinteia* (Bucharest), May 19, 1960 and June 21, 1960. The figures represent the totals at the beginning of the respective years.

** *Anuarul Statistic* (Bucharest), 1959, and *Scinteia* (Bucharest), June 21, 1960.

This is the second of two articles dealing with the rewriting and manipulation of history. The first installment appeared in the May 1960 issue under the title "History Revisited."

The Memory Hole

IN THE ORWELLIAN WORLD of 1984, history becomes an invention of Big Brother. Facts which no longer "fit" are simply dropped down "the memory hole." As new heresies spring up new interpretations of history are needed, and each time the monolithic State must resolve all contradictions. Unfortunately for the Soviet bloc propagandists, what was once a heresy may yet become dogma. Since Stalin's death in 1953, history has risen out of the memory hole like a genie to haunt the present Communist rulers. Gomulka, Rajk, Kostov, even Tito himself, have been, as the word is, "rehabilitated." Depending on the direction of the wind from Moscow, a Rakosi or even a Nagy may be so honored in some future age.

Since the death of Stalin, the memory hole has indeed not been used with the same abandon. The Party *politruks* are beginning to hedge their bets. Disputed facts and ideas are more often ignored than actually contradicted. Thus Tito is hardly ever branded as a traitor—but he is also not hailed as a brother and friend. In the main, the legacy of Stalin still burdens the Communist penmen and may require still further revisions of now-unquestioned doctrines.

THE WARSAW UPRISING

Responsibility for the ill-fated Warsaw Uprising has long rested with the London Poles, according to the official Soviet version of what happened. Although the exile government gave the orders for the underground Home Army to revolt, it was with the expectation that the Germans would be expelled from the city and the advancing Soviet Army greeted in a friendly spirit, with the city firmly in the hands of the non-Communist forces. At the outset, the plan seemed worthy of success. By the end of July 1944 the forward units of the Red Army were on the outskirts of Warsaw. Only the Vistula River separated them from the city itself. On July 29, Radio Moscow broadcast an appeal to the population to rise against the enemy: "Fight the Germans! No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon to bring her liberation." On another occasion the Soviets urged "the whole population to gather round the . . . underground army [and] attack the Germans . . . assist the Red Army in crossing the Vistula." On August 1, the uprising began; within a few days a large part of city was in the hands of the insurgents. Warsaw was ready

to welcome the Soviet troops. At this point, the Soviet advance halted and was not resumed until January 12, 1945. For 63 days the capital held out against the counter-attacking German Army, while the Soviet Army stood by and did nothing to help the beleaguered city. No supplies were forthcoming, no airplanes were sent with food or ammunition. Finally, in September, when the Soviet behavior had become a scandal to the rest of the world, a few US and British planes were allowed to use Soviet facilities to drop supplies. But it was too late. On October 2, the Polish commander, Bor-Komorowski, surrendered to SS General von dem Bach. The city itself was in ruins. When the Soviet Army eventually "liberated" Warsaw, most of the non-Communist underground Home Army had been destroyed. The few remaining underground leaders were soon arrested by the Soviet authorities "for their divisive activities directed against the Soviet Union."

During the bleak Stalinist period from 1945 to 1956, the London government and the Home Army were equally blamed for the "traitorous" Uprising. In 1952, a Polish Party handbook described the Warsaw Uprising as a "provocation aimed against the Soviet Union and against her people." This was the explanation the Party historians devised:

"Such a provocation was proclaimed without advance consultation with either the Soviet or the Polish [Communist-backed] Army and directed by a representative of the traitorous emigre clique. It was to create conditions to enable the bourgeoisie to take over power and with the aid of the Home Army [AK] and the National Armed Forces [NSZ] to oppose the Soviet Army and the Polish People's Army. . . . This vile and traitorous plan, conceived . . . in close cooperation with American espionage agents and Hitler's intelligence service, condemning Warsaw's population to a horrible massacre and financed by dollars and pounds supplied by the Anglo-American imperialists, was implemented in cold blood.

"The AK headquarters, faithful to its traitorous policies, systematically refrained from establishing any contact with the Soviet or Polish Armies. . . . Warsaw, betrayed by the AK leaders and the so-called 'London Government' . . . was dying in the flame and smoke of its fires. . . . On October 2, the traitor Bor-Komorowski signed the capitulation at the headquarters of von dem Bach."

Under such circumstances the Warsaw Uprising was offi-



General Bor-Komorowski, commander of the Polish Home Army (AK), waiting to surrender to the German General von dem Bach.



Men and women of Warsaw producing hand grenades during the 63-day insurrection which took place in the Polish capital in 1944.

Photos from Adam Borkiewicz, *POSTANIE WARSZAWSKIE*, Warsaw, 1957

cially condemned. Yet a large part of the Warsaw population had taken part in the Uprising; members of the Home Army could not be labelled traitors by those who had actually fought at their sides. One of the fruits of the post-Stalin era was that such patent distortions of history could now be revised. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin as a great war leader in 1955 made it possible for the "liberal Polish Communists" who came to power the following year to restore publicly to the members of the Home Army a measure of respectability. In 1957 the Warsaw Uprising was officially celebrated by the Gomulka regime. The history of the Uprising was favorably revised; however, this new interpretation was still molded to the Party line. Although the Home Army was rehabilitated, the London exile government was not.

As the official Polish Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) reported it, July 26, 1957, the anniversary was greeted with joy by the people: "Great excitement has come over Warsaw. She frantically prepares herself for celebrations, for which the hearts of her inhabitants have been longing for so long. She is anxious to make up for all those years during which she could not celebrate this anniversary although she greatly desired to do so." But the ghosts of the past still lingered, and the decision to commemorate the event undoubtedly caused serious discomfort within the Party hierarchy.

In the August 1, 1957 issue of *Trybuna Ludu*, after praising the heroism of the Warsaw insurgents, the lead article went on to say:

"The decision to start an armed struggle in the city was motivated by the narrow and shortsighted interest of the initiators. At that time, no military considerations spoke in favor of an uprising. With criminal thoughtlessness, the London politicians led Warsaw into the fight under the most unfavorable circumstances in order to gain power over the city and to block the ascent of the rule of the people in the liberated territories."

The more popular newspaper *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), of the same date, went much further in recognizing the true rôle the Home Army played in the revolt:

"It is impossible to consider the Warsaw Uprising simply as a shrewd maneuver of its leaders, as has been done in the past. A great deal of moral injustice has been caused

by the contention that the Warsaw Uprising was instigated primarily as a diversionist maneuver against the troops approaching from the east. . . . The Warsaw Uprising broke out in the first place because the oppressors were subjugating the Polish nation. There is an element of falsehood in the contention that the heroic insurgents were the blind instruments of Polish power politics consisting of foreign political elements. . . . A mother whose son . . . was subsequently killed in the sewers would not understand these arguments."

Even the commander of the Home Army was exonerated: "There is no doubt that General Bor-Komorowski was courageous, honest and loyal toward his superiors. Equally nonsensical were the accusations—made in the past—that he was a traitor and that the entire Home Army General Staff maintained contacts with the Germans."³

In the three years following Gomulka's return to power, characterized by a slow withdrawal from many of the liberal gains of the "Polish October," this latter view of history has again been lost. Under no circumstances can the Polish London government be rehabilitated. The current version of the Uprising represents an uneasy compromise between praise for the insurgents and condemnation of the "instigators" of the revolt:

"With regard to the Warsaw Uprising, we clearly differentiate between two currents: the struggle of the city's inhabitants against German occupation and the political conception which lay at the source of the uprising. . . . But an intelligent person will also . . . deed to the next generation the truth—that beside the crystal-clear current of heroism rushed another slimy current of political incentives and political stupidity on the part of those who gave the word for the revolt to begin.

"The Uprising was a political showdown precipitated by the London government; it was aimed politically against the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Soviet Union. The point was to set up within the city authorities representing the London government before the arrival of the Red Army and the Polish Armed Forces fighting at its side. Today, fifteen years later, when all that remains of the London government is some political refuse and several anecdotes, it may be said that the Warsaw Uprising was an attempt on the part of the Polish reaction to stem the tide of history. . . . Consequently, responsibility for the act of starting the revolt, for the



Rudolph Slansky (right), the Czechoslovak Party First Secretary, before his purge in 1952, with the late President Klement Gottwald.

SVET V OBRAZECH (Prague), May 6, 1950

death of hundreds of thousands of people and for the destruction of the city fall on the camp of the Polish reactionaries." ^{4*}

THE YUGOSLAV HERETICS

In the postwar period, only one Eastern European country established a Communist dictatorship without the direct aid of the Red Army; yet Yugoslavia in 1946 adopted a constitution which was a slavish imitation of the Soviet model. Although independent of Moscow's control, the Tito regime before 1949 was surely as Stalinist as the USSR and indeed more rigid than the other new "people's democracies." In 1945 Edward Kardelj, then Yugoslav Vice-President, stated: "We would like the Soviet Union to look upon us as representatives of one of the future Soviet Republics, and not as upon representatives of another country, capable of independently solving questions."⁵

* The Slovak Uprising in September and October 1944 was in some respects similar to the Warsaw Revolt. In this case, Communist partisan units also took part in the military operations, but the USSR consistently refused to send any military aid to the non-Communist groups. Once again the Soviet Union wished to liberate Czechoslovakia without any help from elements hostile to the imposition of a Communist regime. Under the Communist regime since 1948 the Slovak Uprising has been celebrated as an insurrection inspired and led by Communists and aided by the Red Army. The rôle of the Slovak National Council and non-Communist units under its command have been sharply played down.

The Communist leaders in Eastern Europe embraced "glorious Marshal Tito" and the "fraternal Yugoslav people."⁶ The Czechoslovak Party organ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), March 21, 1946, hailed Tito as "a great statesman" who was "supported by the powerful popular forces of his country in building . . . a new Yugoslavia." The Hungarian Stalinist Matyas Rakosi stated on September 10, 1946: "During this great world war we saw with tremendous enthusiasm that there were two peoples who justified the hopes of mankind—the Soviet people and the Yugoslav people."⁷ After Stalin, Tito was viewed as the brightest light in the Marxist constellation, and the unity of East-Central Europe under a Communist yoke was the fervent hope of the Communist leaders after the war. In this task, Yugoslavia was assigned a leading role. A Polish delegation visiting Belgrade, July 14-17, 1946, expressed this feeling in their official declaration:

"We know how to value your heroism and sacrifice suffered during our common struggle for freedom, a struggle conducted under the unyielding leadership of your heroic Marshal Tito. . . . We realize full well that our common security lies in the unity of the Slav world. It is our greatest desire that relations between us will become ever more close. . . . It is our desire that we establish friendly and brotherly contact in all spheres of our cultural and economic life. This problem must dominate all our mutual relations."⁸

Two years later, *Rude Pravo*, June 28, 1948, broke the news that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been expelled from the Cominform. Among other things, the Yugoslavs were accused of nationalism, Trotskyism, of aiding "the growth of capitalist elements in their country," of "glossing over the class struggle," and of being "tools of the kulaks." Specifically, the Yugoslav Communists were guilty (1) of "pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union"; (2) of delaying collectivization of agriculture; (3) of allowing the Yugoslav Party to dissolve into the non-Party People's Front.

In fact, the real "heresy" of the Yugoslav Communists was to insist on their own independence in the face of Soviet domination, whether this be called "bourgeois nationalism" or "national Communism." For the next seven years the patriotism of Marshal Tito and the "fraternal Yugoslav" Communists disappeared into the memory hole. A new version of history emanated from Moscow and the other Satellite capitals. The Polish Stalinist Party boss Bierut, at the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee, November 11, 1949, branded Tito a "traitor and provocateur in the service of the imperialists." The Yugoslav Communists were "a clique . . . trying to assail the ideology of the working classes, to undermine in the eyes of the masses the principles of Marxist-Leninist teaching, to imbue the working masses of Yugoslavia with nationalistic and Fascist methods, and to incite the most backward elements against the USSR and the countries of the People's Democracies."⁹

The wartime role of Tito was also reevaluated. The Budapest newspaper *Magyar Nemzet*, April 23, 1950, declared that Tito "not only broke with the revolutionary

past, he also betrayed it," and claimed that the Yugoslav workers nicknamed Tito "little Hitler." But at the height of the cold war in 1951 the Yugoslav Communists were most often accused of being "lackeys of Anglo-American imperialism"¹⁰ and quasi-members of the Atlantic Pact "preparing for aggression" against the Soviet bloc.¹¹

Particularly exasperating to the Eastern European regimes was Belgrade's agricultural policy. Although committed to collectivization before 1948, two years after the break Yugoslavia began a policy which veered sharply from the Moscow pattern. The Machine Tractor Stations were decentralized, collectivization was slowed down and eventually the regime did away with its system of price controls, allowing prices to seek their own level. In 1953, peasants were permitted to leave the collectives, although the government continued to proclaim adherence to the principle of collectivization. Such functional deviations could not be tolerated by the Soviet bloc, although 1953 marked the year when a "new course" in agricultural production, in the direction of but less sweeping than the Yugoslav changes, was adopted in the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Yet in 1951, Radio Bucharest, September 18, described the Yugoslav relaxation of price controls in the following bitter terms: "Pretending to have a special interest in the Yugoslav peasants, the Titoist regime has introduced new measures aimed at breaking the peasants' resistance and at strengthening capitalism in the villages. The measures taken by the State . . . are shamelessly explained as an action whose purpose is to help peasants acquire technical tools at reasonable prices. In reality, these measures help the kulaks mercilessly exploit the poorest peasants."

With Stalin's death the Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia gradually changed; the epithets hurled by Moscow at Belgrade grew steadily milder. Relations between Yugoslavia and the Satellites, however, showed little improvement. But in 1955, at last, the Soviet leaders went to Canossa, in this case Brioni, and admitted the failure of their anti-Yugoslav policies. Party boss Nikita Khrushchev blamed the 1948 split on Lavrenti Beria, Soviet secret police chief from 1938 to 1953, and accepted publicly the former heresy that every country has a right to choose its own "road to Socialism." In the Belgrade Declaration of June 2, 1955, the USSR promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia "for any reason whatsoever, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because . . . different forms of Socialist development are solely the concern of individual countries." This second honeymoon lasted two short years.

During this period, the virulent personal attacks on Tito ceased. The Soviet bloc scribes found words of praise for the Yugoslav people and for the friendship between their countries and Belgrade. On August 9, 1955, the Hungarian Premier and long-time Stalinist Matyas Rakosi "rejoiced" over the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. Like Khrushchev, he blamed a former secret police chief, Gabor Peter, for "aggravating Hungarian-Yugoslav relations." By his activities, Peter "deceived us, slandering the leaders of the Yugoslav people and thus caused great harm to both countries. . . . Now that all this is clear to us, we shall do all we can to see that relations



Wladyslaw Gomulka, now First Secretary of the Polish Party, shortly after his release from five years imprisonment by his "comrades."

between Hungary and Yugoslavia improve and become more friendly."¹²

THE ANTI-TITOIST PURGES

Even more dramatic than the Soviet bloc's reversal toward Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Communists were the rehabilitations of Satellite Party leaders purged during the Stalinist era for their alleged espousal of Titoism. Rajk in Hungary and Kostov in Bulgaria were cleared of the charges levelled against them. In part, so was Slansky in Czechoslovakia.*

The trial against the Bulgarian, then First Deputy Premier and Secretary-General of his Party, had been initiated in December 1949 when Kostov was accused of working as an Anglo-American and Yugoslav spy. In his written deposition, dated October 27, 1949, he "admitted" his guilt: "I admit that . . . I maintained criminal contacts with Tito and his gang. Our common task—Tito's in Yugoslavia and mine in Bulgaria—consisted in carrying out a policy of splitting our countries from the USSR in order to bind them again to the Anglo-American bloc." In court, Kostov repudiated his confession. Finally, two days before his execution, December 14, 1949, he allegedly presented a petition to the Presidium declaring himself guilty as charged. The year following the Tito-Khrushchev rapprochement,

* The Polish Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka was finally freed in 1955 after many years in prison. But although his Titoist "deviations" were pardoned, he was criticized again in the months preceding the "Polish October" for his "reformist" views on collectivization and industry.

Bulgarian Party chief Todor Zhivkov, after echoing the Soviet leader's attack on the "cult of the individual" and directing it against the former Bulgarian Party boss Vulko Chervenkov, declared tersely that Kostov had been "incorrectly accused of having criminal links with Yugoslav State organs and leaders." Such charges "were fabricated and not in harmony with the truth."¹³

A month earlier, Hungarian minister Laszlo Rajk, sentenced to death in 1949, was similarly absolved from charges of planning with the help of US and Yugoslav governments to overthrow the Hungarian regime. Rajk had also "confessed": "It is undoubtedly true that I became an instrument of Tito, or rather of Tito's policy—the same Tito who followed in Hitler's wake and followed Hitler's policy in the Balkans . . . and who was backed by the American imperialists, his ruling masters."¹⁴ With traditional Communist irony, it was Hungarian Party chief Matyas Rakosi, the man given main credit for exposing the "Titoist-Trotskyite-Rajk clique" who announced that "the Rajk trial was based on the 'provocations' of the secret police chief Gabor Peter." (Radio Budapest, March 29, 1956.) A few months later, after Rakosi had been forced out of power, there was a State funeral for Rajk; Deputy Premier Antal Apro then referred indirectly to Rakosi's own "Stalinist methods" and

pursuit of the "personality cult." The "slanders" against Rajk, he added, "were connected with slanders against Comrade Tito and other distinguished leaders of Yugoslavia."¹⁵ Ferenc Munnich, now Premier, eulogized Rajk as a man "loved and respected by the working people": "He did not die the glorious death, the death of heroes; he was destroyed by sadistic criminals who came into the sunshine from the gutter of the personality cult. They pushed into the background Laszlo Rajk's comrades-in-arms and the bearers of the Party's traditions, who had risked their lives on several occasions proving their loyalty to the Party. The falsification of history . . . was born in the gutter of the personality cult."¹⁶

The trial and execution of Czechoslovak Party First Secretary Rudolf Slansky in November 1952 was also revised in the post-Stalin thaw. At this time the accusation that Slansky was a "Trotskyite-Titoist-Zionist . . . bourgeois nationalist traitor" was deemed false, although Slansky was still not fully rehabilitated. Only the charges of "Titoism" were formally withdrawn. At his trial, Slansky had admitted he had wished to become "another Tito." This spurious confession was explained at a press conference, May 24, 1956, when Premier Viliam Siroky revealed that "as a result of forged documents, unjust accusations against



On the left, Tito as he was portrayed during his break with Stalin. Above, a rehabilitated Tito as he appeared during his short-lived reconciliation with Nikita Khrushchev in Belgrade in 1955.

Photos from URZICA (Bucharest), June 3, 1950 and IZVESTIA (Moscow), May 28, 1955

Shortly after the reconciliation, Khrushchev told an audience in Bulgaria that "Yugoslavia did not abandon her sovereignty but maintained her independence from the imperialists." (June 3, 1955).

almost all the leading State and Party officials of Yugoslavia were made . . . and the formulation of a false thesis of 'Titoism' resulted. As far as 'Titoism' was mentioned in the Slansky trial, it is a matter of course that the statement does not hold water. However, this does in no way . . . influence the facts of the criminal deeds for which Slansky was tried. If we exclude the concept of 'Titoism,' of 'Titoist methods' from the accusation . . . this does not influence the substance of the matter."¹⁷

THE HERESY REVIVED

Ideological differences were never wholly smoothed over after the reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1955. The events in Hungary in 1956 which Tito termed a "justified" revolt in its initial stages, hastened the resumption of hostilities between Belgrade and the bloc which finally came to a head in November 1957 when Yugoslavia refused to sign the Moscow Declaration—a call for the unity of all the Communist Parties under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Separate roads to "Socialism" were still permitted as long as they pointed in the direction of Moscow. Yugoslavia made its own position clear in April 1958 at the Sixth Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists, producing a program reiterating a concept of different paths to "Socialism" and of the danger arising when any one Communist State tries to assume ideological superiority over any other. It could only be interpreted by Moscow as a challenge to the Soviet Party as the leading Party and true interpreter of Marxism-Leninism in the Communist world. The Soviet bloc's reply to Belgrade was to evoke the specter of "revisionism" as the chief danger to Communist ideology. Spearheaded by China, the USSR and the Satellites opened a new barrage of propaganda against the "Yugoslav revisionists."

To the tune of "peaceful coexistence is not ideological coexistence" the Party publicists fired away at the Yugoslav Communists with invective which at times equaled the language of Stalin. As long as Tito continued to support Khrushchev's foreign policy, however, an all-out offensive was not launched. In June 1958 Khrushchev addressed the Bulgarian Party Congress and called the Yugoslav Communists "defenders of the revisionist Nagy group" during the Hungarian Revolt. Referring to Yugoslav acceptance of American aid, he asked: "Why do the imperialist bosses, while striving to obliterate the Socialist States from the face of the earth and squash the Communist movement, at the same time finance one of the Socialist countries, granting that country credits and free gifts?"¹⁸ As the attacks continued, Albania soon assumed the role of the most virulent antagonist, and Poland, also a recipient of American aid, was the most guarded. Czechoslovak Premier Siroky called the Yugoslav program "one of treason to Marxism"¹⁹ and the Bulgarian Party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo*, June 25, 1958, termed the program "a catechism of contemporary revisionism." The Albanian diatribes were unrestrained. The following is a sample of Tirana's vituperation from a speech delivered September 1, 1958, by Hysni Kapo, a member of the Albanian Party Secretariat: "Tito's Fascist band and his police State, sworn

enemies of Marxism-Leninism in the service of imperialism, especially American imperialism, have, in return for American dollars, deprived the Yugoslav people of the possibility of strengthening their friendship with the Soviet people and the other peoples of the great Socialist camp."²⁰ Only the Communist Chinese rivalled the Albanians in the vehemence of their denunciations.

Detente

In the fall of 1959 and in the months preceding the summit conference in May 1960, the tone of the anti-Yugoslav diatribes became once again more muted. As Khrushchev sought to bind Belgrade's "neutrality" ever closer to his own foreign policy goals, the big guns of the Party propagandists were silenced. Although "Yugoslav revisionism" was still assailed in theoretical journals, the popular press and radio began to stress friendly relations with Belgrade and ceased to link "revisionism" inevitably with "Tito's clique." Not that words of praise were showered on the Yugoslav Communists; silence and terse announcements of cultural and scientific and trade agreements between Belgrade and the other East European countries most characterized this period. Only Tirana and occasionally Peiping continued to send out vicious salvos against the "Yugoslav Trotskyites, factionalists, deviationists, opportunists, revisionists, adventurers, spies and lackeys of the Italo-Germans, the Anglo-Americans . . . the revisionist Yugoslav renegades themselves—the major terrible danger which has savagely attacked our Party and people and the entire Communist movement."²¹

Otherwise, the Soviet bloc press muffled their criticisms and even credited Belgrade with furthering the cause of "peaceful coexistence"²² and with having achieved considerable success in their "industrial and cultural development."²³ As the summit conference neared, the *modus vivendi* between Belgrade and the East European bloc grew more firm. When a Yugoslav trade union boss visited Moscow in January 1960, he was quoted as saying, "I was magnificently received in the Soviet Union . . . [and] was convinced from my talks with Comrade Khrushchev that there exist conditions for further improvement of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia."²⁴ Finally, on the eve of the summit, Polish Party leader Gomulka referred to the "thirteen Socialist countries [which] exist today," apparently recognizing Yugoslavia as one of them. It seemed that Belgrade was about to be readmitted into the "Communist club."

The sudden reversal of Soviet tactics following the downing of the American reconnaissance plane in the USSR and the subsequent collapse of the summit talks may well signal a new reversal in the tone of pronouncements *vis-a-vis* the Yugoslav Communists. Marshal Tito's statement, May 17, condemning "the flight of American aircraft into the airspace of the Soviet Union" but concluding that the plane incident "should not and must not" be used as a reason to revive the cold war provoked a sharp reaction in Moscow. Moscow's *Kommunist*, May 23, assailed Tito's stand as aiding the forces of imperialism, declaring also that Yugoslavia was trying to assert its "neutrality" not so much

JANOS KADAR ON IMRE NAGY

The Hungarian Revolt broke out on Tuesday, October 23, 1956, when students, demonstrating in Budapest, demanded the return to power of former Premier Imre Nagy. The following day, Imre Nagy was named Premier and on Thursday, October 25, Janos Kadar replaced Erno Gero as Party Chief, and was also named Minister of State. On October 30, Nagy announced the abolition of the one-party system. Kadar, in a statement over Radio Budapest, the same day, supported Nagy:

"I declare that every member of the Hungarian [Party] agrees with the resolutions passed by the presidium of the Council of Ministers. For my part, I can also state that I fully agree with . . . Imre Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Ferenc Erdei, my acquaintances and friends, my highly esteemed compatriots whom I respect."

After the Nagy government was overthrown by the Red Army, Kadar assumed the position of Premier. Nagy himself took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. Speaking to a delegation of a workers' council, in the waning days of the Uprising, Kadar said:

"I, who was a minister in Imre Nagy's government, must say with complete frankness, that according to my personal conviction neither Imre Nagy himself nor his political group consciously wanted to set up a counterrevolutionary regime." (Radio Budapest, November 11.)

Under an agreement with Yugoslavia, November 21, the Kadar regime guaranteed safe conduct for Nagy and his companions if they left the confines of

the Embassy. Instead, Soviet military authorities arrested Nagy and deported him to Romania. Kadar, however, promised not to harm the ex-Premier:

"We promised that we would not take measures in the courts against Imre Nagy and his friends because of their mistakes committed in the past, not even if they later acknowledge these themselves. We are keeping our promise. . . ." (Radio Budapest, November 26, 1956.)

Kadar's tone shortly changed:

"The imperialists . . . placed their hopes in him [Imre Nagy] as a well-known Communist enjoying great prestige, and they directed their policy accordingly. . . . But there is no such thing as national Communism. . . . Imre Nagy . . . indeed fomented the armed attack against the Hungarian People's Republic, and . . . protected the cause of the counter-revolution." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], February 5, 1957.)

On June 17, 1958 the Hungarian government reported the execution of Imre Nagy. Here is Kadar's epitaph:

"The Hungarian people have settled accounts with those who prepared and launched the 1956 counterrevolutionary insurrection with the active support of the imperialists. The broadest masses of the Hungarian working people received with calmness, satisfaction and as the accomplishment of their demand the sentence of the supreme court of the Hungarian People's Republic that imposed the deserved punishment on the group of chief criminals of the counterrevolutionary insurrection, Imre Nagy and his associates." (*Nepszabadsag*, June 28, 1958.)

between two blocs as between two social systems—"Socialism and capitalism." If Premier Khrushchev's performance in Paris indicates a shift to the language of the cold war, then the Yugoslav Communists may insist that they are the only Communists in the world who have remained true to the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence." Such a posture, coupled with their long-standing claim to be the true heirs of Marx and Lenin, would undoubtedly force the Soviet bloc to launch yet another campaign against Marshal Tito and "the lackeys of imperialism."

GOMULKA AND THE POLISH COLLECTIVES

Alone of all the Satellites, Poland had no great anti-Titoist show trial. Yet in 1948, the then Polish Party Secretary-General Wladyslaw Gomulka was removed from this post for "rightist deviation." In particular, he was accused of demonstrating a "conciliatory attitude" toward the Yugoslav Party and of showing a "negative attitude" toward the "Socialist reconstruction of agriculture." Doubtless, Gomulka was telling the truth when he defended himself

by insisting that differences between him and the Politburo were of a tactical rather than an ideological nature. Although Gomulka never in his career abandoned the goal of agricultural collectivization, he had advocated a go-slow policy in the face of recalcitrant peasants and poor agricultural production. In 1951, at the height of the Stalinist tyranny, he was imprisoned. His rehabilitation was not officially confirmed until the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1956 when the charges against him were rescinded.

The problem of Gomulka reflected more than anything else the Polish Communists' concern with the progress and tempo of collectivization. At the end of the war, before the Party had fully consolidated its power, the then Minister of Trade, Hilary Minc rejected "as fantastic and clearly provocative those insinuations, spread by the enemy, which speak of the government's alleged desire to introduce a collective system of economy and to organize collective farms. We stand firmly on the grounds of individual land ownership." At that same time, Politburo member Roman Zam-

browski stated that the Polish Communists "have never proposed the slogan of collectivization."²⁵ Three years later, with the Party firmly in control, Hilary Minc spoke of "limiting the growth of capitalistic elements in the village" and of the need "to march forward toward a new system" which would necessitate "a psychological transformation of the farmer."²⁶

Such tactics are the familiar staple of Communist *ap-paratchiks*, and subsequent statements about the necessity for collectivization followed the Stalinist pattern into the next decade. In 1950, Zambrowski described the road of Polish agriculture as follows: "We must utilize more fully the priceless experience of the USSR kolkhozes and the teaching of Comrade Stalin on the subject of collectivization . . . and then we shall fulfill the great tasks of the Six-Year Plan—the construction of Socialist foundations in the city and countryside."²⁷ But in Poland things did not proceed strictly according to plan, and the Party, without changing its official policy, had to devise a new line to cope with the fact that private farms were proving more productive than the collectives.

It was Gomulka, when he returned to power in 1956, who reversed the trend in Socialization of agriculture: "Agrarian policy requires certain corrections. As far as collective farms are concerned, healthy farms ought to be helped by repayable investment credits, and all forms of State grants should be abolished. Collectives which have poor chances of development and which bring only economic loss should not be granted credits. The members of such farms ought to be allowed to decide whether to dissolve them or not. . . . The joining of collective farms is voluntary. This excludes not only threats or psychological compulsion, but also economic compulsion."²⁸

Shortly after Gomulka's decision was announced, the flimsy structure of Poland's "Socialized agriculture" virtually collapsed, though the Party has still never officially abandoned its doctrine that the future of agriculture requires collectivization.* The drift to orthodoxy since the heady days of the "Polish October" has been slow but steady and has been characterized in the agricultural sector by the device of uniting independent peasant organizations known as agricultural circles into the embryo of some form of "Socialized agricultural enterprise." In order to "mold the Socialist consciousness of the peasant masses"—that is to say, in order to expand the agricultural circles—Gomulka proposed in March 1959 to use "administrative measures" if such were needed. "Administrative measures" probably does not mean direct force, since the tax structure can be manipulated to achieve the same ends, but Gomulka was the "Savior of Poland" who had promised to exclude "threats of psychological . . . [and] economic compulsion" in his dealings with the peasantry. The future of collectivization itself in Poland is still uncertain, but the search for euphemisms to persuade the peasants to accept

a nationalized economy will undoubtedly go on. As the Party line wavers, shifts, reverses itself, past promises will be ignored, history will be revised, and agile Party hacks will discover new sophistries to reconcile their Marxist-Leninist heritage to the necessities of time.

NO TEXTBOOKS NEEDED

"The history of the Hungarian Party was taught without textbooks or notes. A textbook had been in the works for ten years, but it has still not been published because of the constant reevaluation of the past. In the first draft, for example, Rajk was one of the leaders of the illegal Party; in the second, he was a Titoist agent; in the third, after his rehabilitation, he was a martyr. The situation was similar in Bela Kun's case."

From *The Revolt of the Mind* by Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.

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- ¹⁰ *VECHERNI NOVINI* (Sofia), September 20, 1951.
- ¹¹ *Radio Bucharest*, July 30, 1951.
- ¹² *Radio Budapest*, August 9, 1955.
- ¹³ *Radio Sofia*, August 14, 1956.
- ¹⁴ *FIGYELO* (Budapest), September 24, 1949.
- ¹⁵ *Radio Budapest*, October 3, 1956.
- ¹⁶ *SZABAD NEP* (Budapest), October 7, 1956.
- ¹⁷ *RUDE PRAVO* (Prague), May 25, 1956.
- ¹⁸ *Radio Sofia*, June 3, 1958.
- ¹⁹ *RUDE PRAVO*, June 19, 1958.
- ²⁰ *ZERI I POPULIT* (Tirana), September 2, 1958.
- ²¹ *Radio Tirana*, November 28, 1959.
- ²² *TRYBUNA LUDU*, November 28, 1959.
- ²³ *LITERATUREN FRONT* (Sofia), December 2, 1959.
- ²⁴ *Radio Moscow*, January 26, 1960.
- ²⁵ *GLOS LUDU*, May 6, 1945.
- ²⁶ *NOWE DROGI* (Warsaw), July-August, 1948.
- ²⁷ *NOWE DROGI*, July-August 1950.
- ²⁸ *TRYBUNA LUDU*, October 21, 1956.

* In seven years of power the Polish Party had succeeded in collectivizing less than 10 percent of the arable land. A year after Gomulka returned to power, only a little over 1 percent of land was still collectivized.

Men in the News

Romania's Party Chief



Gheorghiu-Dej receiving the traditional bread and salt from peasants during his 1958 tour of Czechoslovakia.

Rumania Today, No. 12, 1958

POLITICAL LONGEVITY IS OFTEN hard to explain in a chaotic world where so many brilliant careers are untimely cut short; it becomes downright mysterious in the lupine struggles of East European Communism. The career of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej—undisputed boss of Romania since the removal of Ana Pauker in 1952—has the shine of transcendent success. It is said that one element in his fortune is adaptability, a trait which has helped him to stay afloat among dangerous cross currents and to rule without becoming a target of hate. His success has also been ascribed to good-natured mediocrity: though hardly outstanding in intellect or character (his ignorance, in fact, is the butt of many popular jokes, while his extravagance and venery are notorious), he is not regarded as a fanatic or a tyrant.

Born plain Gheorghe Gheorghiu in a small town in Moldavia in 1901, he rose to power while his colleagues around him were falling, and has reigned for the past eight years without visible challenge. His political career has no doubt been favored by his reputation as a "man of the people." Unlike other top Romanian Communists whose careers were damaged at one point or another because of their "alien," Muscovite or bourgeois backgrounds (i.e., former Finance Minister Vasile Luca was of Hungarian extraction, Moscow-trained Ana Pauker was a Jew, and former Minister of Justice Lucretiu Patrascanu, arrested as a "Titoist" in 1948, was a well-educated middle-class lawyer), Gheorghe Gheorghiu had the triple advantage of being a "worker," a "native son" and a home grown Communist. Even today he can capitalize on these facts despite his unworker-like tastes and his record of unflinching loyalty to Moscow. And although today he is a reliable tool of the Kremlin, he is one of the few Romanian Communists who

ever enjoyed—at least at the onset of his career—some measure of popular support.

He first came to public attention in 1933 as a strike leader at the Grivita railway workshop on the outskirts of Bucharest. Under order from King Carol, the strike was brutally suppressed, the workers fired on by the army, and Gheorghe Gheorghiu, for his role as an organizer, sentenced to twelve years in prison. In 1940, after occupying Bessarabia, the Soviets negotiated for his release, but their efforts were unsuccessful: while Ana Pauker was handed over to the Kremlin in exchange for an aging Romanian peasant leader, Gheorghiu-Dej remained in jail. There he is said to have improved his rudimentary education (elementary school) by reading illicit Marxist literature. In 1944, to placate the Red Army, the Antonescu regime allowed him to escape. He emerged as Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the latter word being the name of one of the towns in which he had been incarcerated. Wearing this badge of distinction—assumed in pride rather than bitterness—he took an active part in politics and climbed steadily to the heights of power.

In the coalition governments before the Communist takeover in 1948, he was Minister of Communications and, subsequently, Minister of Economic Affairs; in due course, he was made a Politburo member and elected Secretary General of the Party (1945) and a deputy to the National Assembly (1946). He attended the Paris Peace Conference (1946), the first Cominform meeting in Poland (1947), and in 1948, after being named First Deputy Premier, he was a participant in the historic Cominform session which met to expel Yugoslavia. In June 1952, with the liquidation of the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu faction of the Party, he became Premier; in 1953, he also took over the post

of First Party Secretary; in 1954, with the area-wide emphasis on collective leadership, he resigned as First Secretary; and in 1955, he resigned as Premier and became First Secretary, an act which conformed with the latest Moscow fashion but which in no way diminished his uncontested position as number one man in the country.

The Art of Survival

To have remained unscathed in these turbulent years took both shrewdness and caution. There are rumors that in 1948 he was about to be purged as a "national Communist," and that he saved himself only by hewing to Moscow's orders, but there is little evidence to support this. In 1954, he was as assiduous in bringing Patrascanu to trial as he was in denouncing Patrascanu's enemy Vasile Luca who, after almost two years in prison and despite his contribution to Patrascanu's downfall, was sentenced as a traitor to the working class.

What role Gheorghiu-Dej played in the shattering of the Party leadership in 1952 is not exactly known. Certainly, the Muscovite Pauker clique was thoroughly hated by the populace, and her group was used as a scapegoat for the Party's unpopularity and failures. (The same aim was behind the famous Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia which, in addition, had strong anti-Semitic overtones.) The official accusations levelled at the Pauker group, however, were tantamount to saying that, ruthless as they were, they had not been ruthless enough. Ana Pauker was charged with sabotaging Romania's farm collectivization program* and Luca was denounced as an opponent of the 1952 monetary reform, which drastically reduced the buying power of the *leu*. If these accusations bear any resemblance to truth, it is possible to assume that the Pauker faction believed that heavy industrialization could only be achieved at the expense of farm collectivization, and that for this heresy they were forced to pay a price. Gheorghiu-Dej came out as the orthodox spokesman for the simultaneous communization of town and countryside—that is, until mid-1953, when, as orthodox as ever, he was forced to admit in the manner of his colleagues elsewhere in the orbit that the economy was under too great a strain. At that time, in launching the "new course," he said:

"The rate of industrialization has been forced, especially with regard to heavy industry, which led to the establishment of too large a volume of capital investment in comparison with the national revenue, exceeding even the provisions of the Five Year Plan. . . . The slogan of achieving the Five Year Plan in four years was launched without sufficient study and does not correspond to the real prospects of the national economy."

In private life, he has been considerably less orthodox. He and his two daughters, to whom he is extremely partial (his wife left him long ago, during his years in prison) live very well, indulging their whims in an almost regal

* Ana Pauker was also accused of "leftist deviation"—that is, violating the "principle of voluntariness" in the formation of collective farms.



Gheorghiu-Dej (wearing hat) and Hungarian visitors Janos Kadar and Antal Apró, in Bucharest for seven-day talks with the regime.

Romania Today, No. 4, 1958

fashion. In contrast to the proletarian simplicity of Gomulka and the industrious rectitude of Kadar, Gheorghiu-Dej's image is that of a *bon vivant* and a lover of women. Despite this, he has managed to keep his Party and country firmly in hand throughout the purges and upheavals which have beset other Satellite regimes since 1953.

In 1955 and 1956, there were only faint signs of ferment in Romania, and these were promptly, if not entirely successfully, squelched. The apparent quietude in Romania may be attributed in part to the disillusionment and cynicism of an intelligentsia which never took Communism as seriously as did the Poles and Hungarians, and which has followed a course of passive resistance rather than overt unrest. Partly, it can also be explained by the fact that since 1952 there have been no powerful factions within the Party, and that Gheorghiu-Dej holds all the power. This seems particularly true since the Politburo purge of July 1957, when the man believed to be Gheorghiu-Dej's chief opponent, Josif Chisinevski, was removed along with Miron Constantinescu, the Minister of Culture and Education, who was economic chief in the crucial years of 1949-1955. (The purge followed close on the heels of the purge of the anti-Party group in Moscow and probably was connected with it.)

Officially, Chisinevski and Constantinescu were accused both of "dogmatism" and "liberalism." They were denounced for having had connections with Ana Pauker, for "misinterpreting" the documents of the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress, for advocating a policy which would have weakened Party militancy and unity and, among other things, for an attack against the State Security organs. They were stopped, it was claimed, because they "would have given free rein to the petty bourgeois threat. . . . In this respect, the events in Hungary are full of lessons."

Thus Gheorghiu-Dej was able to welcome Khrushchev with broad smiles in 1960, the unchallenged ruler of the shell he inherited.

Through Yugoslav Eyes

The Yugoslav press often carries dispatches of more than passing interest on the countries of the Soviet bloc. Whether from correspondents stationed inside these countries or recently returned therefrom, whether providing straightforward information, ironic sidelights or flat criticism, the glimpses of the orthodox Communist world through the eyes of a maverick Communist press are of value and significance.

Tongue-in-cheek fun at hyper-planning.

East Germany: "Symmetrical Teats"

BERLIN: IN THE PLAN for intensifying farm collectivization, East German Party leader Ulbricht has outlined as one of the primary tasks the breeding of 'model cows.' Speaking at the recent plenum of the Party Central Committee, he specified that 'a model cow' should have a powerful construction, that it should weigh at least 600 to 650 kilograms, and should calve every year. In one year such a cow should supply 5,000 to 6,000 liters of milk with a four percent butterfat content. Ulbricht stated further that a 'model cow' should possess a large udder with four symmetrically placed teats 50 cm. from the ground. . . .

"According to the press reports, Ulbricht also gave detailed instructions on hog breeding. For fattening and other work, a hog breeder is not allowed to use more than 28 seconds daily per hog. In this way, one pig breeder is supposed to attend to 2,000 hogs daily to achieve the norm. Furthermore, instructions have been issued on the artificial insemination of hogs. In this connection, Ulbricht blamed the East German Minister of Agriculture for having applied a 'mistaken ideology' in inseminating hogs. . . .

"The Central Committee greeted with stormy applause a proposal put forth by a Politburo candidate and Party Secretary of the Rostock region. . . . He recommended that eggs should be sent from Rostock to [East] Berlin by plane to improve the supply of the population. Rostock is 200 kilometers from Berlin. . . ." (B. Dikic in *Politika* [Belgrade], April 8, 1960.)

Irony aimed at Chinese excesses.

China: An Inch of Individualism

PEIPING: THAT INDIVIDUALISM is the 'root of all evil' in Chinese society, that . . . the basis of recent rightist-opportunist manifestations was bourgeois individualism, that previous bourgeois rightists were heart and soul inveterate individualists, that even in the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party various signs of bourgeois individualism appear . . . and that this vice is especially peculiar to Chinese intellectuals—has been said many times . . . in the Chinese press. . . . The vice was publicly branded . . . its numerous

destructive aspects analyzed . . . and the whole problem could have been removed from the agenda had there not appeared—as we are informed by the *Youth Herald*—a small number of young Chinese intellectuals, who asked: . . . 'great' individualism is obviously harmful . . . but what if I keep a small part of individualism in my head? Will this be very harmful and can one even refer to the destructive effects of a bit of individualism in human nature? . . .

"The youth paper replied that the question was posed incorrectly, and that such conceptions had to be eradicated. . . . This 'bit,' it was explained, was nothing but a 'small white field' for raising bourgeois concepts . . . and as such it was quite incompatible with the 'red field' of working class ideology and outlook. People who are willing to retain this 'bit' are actually . . . in favor of a reserved attitude towards the revolution and Socialism and are far from being heart and soul for the revolution. A 'bit of individualism' . . . is an infectious poison which leads you to the bourgeoisie, spreads, and has a destructive effect. . . .

"How does this happen? How does a 'bit of individualism' . . . become transformed into a vice which takes you to the road of opposition to the Party and Socialism? There is a reply to this question, too. Word for word, it is: Your 'bit of individualism' may keep quiet for 360 to 365 days in the year; it may be that for the duration of this time you will not pose any unacceptable or impossible requests. . . . And yet, the time will come when your spark of individualism will flare up into a flame of selfish dissatisfaction, when your individualist 'ego' will be opposed to the general needs and requirements of the revolution.

"And when does this happen? . . . Most often, and almost as a rule . . . when the revolution develops more speedily and your 'bit of individualism' shouts: we go too quickly, we must let up.

"It also happens when transient . . . crises occur in the general development; then your hesitation, based on individualism, may lead you to the side of the enemy. It happens most often when the general interests of the revolution . . . require you to sacrifice . . . your momentary and personal interests. In these cases, it is stressed, the 'bit of individualism' provokes unjustifiable personal claims and desires, compels you to put in the forefront the matter of your wages and your position and, in the long run irrepressibly leads you to the road of opposition. . . .

"The basic conclusion is . . . that you should not harbor even a speck of individualism if you don't want to proceed along the road of the enemies of the Party and the revolution." (Branko Bogunovic in *Politika* [Belgrade], May 6, 1960.)

Criticism of agricultural collectivization policy and a defense of Yugoslav methods.

The Satellites: Too Much "Socialism"

IN SPITE OF their large percentage of collectivized land, the Soviet-bloc countries have not achieved in the Socialist sector of agriculture a progress commensurate with their objective potential and huge investments. . . . There is no justification for collectivization in some East European countries which have . . . imitated Soviet experience in a stereotyped way and have claimed loudly that . . . the only true Socialism in the countryside is Socialism which is measured by the percentage of collectivized land. Anybody unwilling to follow this line is accused of developing capitalism in the villages, of strengthening kulaks, and of not building Socialism. Time and again, the only proof offered for the existence of Socialism in the countryside is the percentage of collectivized land, instead of real results which, throughout the world, are the only real standard for measuring success. . . .

"State farms and agricultural collectives in Eastern Europe have achieved the same or much lower . . . production than the individual peasants. Hungarian statistical publications show that agricultural collectives and State farms have achieved much poorer results than individual peasants; the situation today has not changed essentially, al-

though 66 percent of the land has been collectivized. The same is true of Czechoslovakia.

"Other countries like Bulgaria, with more than 90 percent of the land collectivized, Romania with 72 percent, and East Germany with 90 percent—have not, in the Socialist sector, achieved the progress commensurate with their objective potential and huge investments. Quite another situation prevails in Poland, which had such bad experiences with the old-type *kolkhozes* that they are not mentioned, even in long-range plans. Poland does not insist that the Socialist sector should increase, but even the greater part of the 800,000 hectares of State land is given to private peasants who pay rent for it. . . .

"If one could draw any conclusions from the above, it is that all people who criticize us for not building Socialism in the countryside and who say that all our attempts have failed, have been proved wrong. For even our 'little' Socialism in the countryside has yielded much more than other places where, along with the absence of other conditions, there has been 'too much' Socialism." (Ivica Bodnaruk in *Oslobodjenje* [Sarajevo], April 10, 1960.)

Description of the latest element in the Chinese Communist upheaval.

China: Urban Communes

PEIPING: All reports on the character and purpose of urban communes agree that their main task is 'the collectivization of production and the collectivization of the entire life' of the urban population. The commentaries emphasize that in the era of the great leap forward . . . it has become necessary to employ all 'unproductives' (and house-



Slum clearance in the Chengchow district, Honan province. The work is being done by members of the Red Flag People's Commune, one of the first urban communes in China, founded in 1958 during the Party's drive for "iron and steel" and for full use of the country's manpower.

China Reconstructs (Peiping), July 1960



A public dining room, one of 58 in the Red Flag Commune which, it is claimed, has freed 2,648 housewives for full-time production.

China Reconstructs (Peiping), July 1960

wives are the principal group so considered) in some field of production. Thus, the idea rose to 'liberate housewives from household tyranny' and employ them, along with all other unemployed citizens from 16 to 60 . . . in some productive work.

"When the question of where to employ these citizens arises, the so-called street industries are usually designated. These are a great number of small enterprises and workshops begun by the citizens themselves who provide the tools, raw materials (mainly waste materials) and organize production, etc. According to the Chinese press, there are collective workshops for the manufacture of traditional Chinese clothing and footwear, for the processing of paper products . . . metals and glass, for handicrafts and the manufacture of simple electrical appliances. . . .

"An article in the Peiping Daily states that [street industry] developed spontaneously . . . that the entire process in Peiping began when some citizens voluntarily surrendered their premises for the opening of street enterprises and workshops. Some donated furniture and others renounced three months' wages to create the necessary capital. Only subsequently did State enterprises and institutions give tech-

nical and other aid, and in this way 769 'street factories' were started. By the end of March some 100,000 persons were employed and about 3,500 production teams were formed with more than 75,000 newly employed citizens. In the same period . . . about 250,000 citizens, or 75 percent of all unemployed people in Peiping from 16 to 60 years old, were transformed from consumers into producers.

"This was the so-called collectivization of production phase, which was followed by the 'collectivization of life.' After housewives were included in production, someone had to feed the housewives and everyone who depended on their housework. Opening canteens for mass feeding was the first step towards the 'collectivization of life.' At the same time, infants' and children's nurseries were opened as well as 'homes of happiness' for old people. . . . It is reported that in the city of Chungking, with a population of one million, 80 percent of the citizens eat in mass canteens and 60 percent of the children are accommodated in communal children's institutions. . . .

"The next phase was . . . collectively to meet the exigencies of life . . . i.e., laundry, clothing repairs. . . . Many collective laundries and bathing establishments, barber and repair shops, street centers for boiling water, for mail delivery and newspaper sales sprang up in this phase of collectivization. According to the latest press reports, 66,000 such centers with 450,000 employed have been opened in cities throughout the country. The press also reports that in some places, street centers have even been opened for conducting weddings and funerals.

"In connection with this, substantial changes have taken place in . . . the supply and distribution of consumer goods to the city population. The guiding principle in this change was . . . that a big collective can always operate more rationally and economically than individual households. The mass canteens became the main centers for the supply and distribution of food, although cards for allotted supplies are still in the possession of those who have not joined the canteens and communes. . . .

"The city communes are far from being a perfect or smoothly running machine; many problems still exist. . . . But the Chinese city communes exist and, as one newspaper says, the movement for their further propagation is 'spreading like a spring tempest.' " (Branko Bogunovic in *Politika* [Belgrade], April 24, 1960.)

Consumer poverty in the richest of the Satellites.

Czechoslovakia: Ready Money but No Goods

"WHEN SOMEONE acquainted with the economic potential [of Czechoslovakia] looks at the available consumer goods, he must instinctively ask several questions. . . . Why, for example, aren't there enough vegetables and fruits? Oranges, lemons and other southern fruits, as well as apples, are extremely scarce. In addition, the assortment of textiles and shoes is very small and their quality markedly inferior. The same is true of . . . so-called household con-

sumer goods . . . and the contrast between the consumer markets and the country's economic potential is even more striking considering the generally high purchasing power of the Czechoslovak citizen. It would seem that the average monthly income of 1,300 *koruny* would enable people to satisfy more of their demands than the market allows. The fact that there are more than 50,000 Prague citizens with money in their pockets, waiting to get a car, or with large savings because they are waiting for a greater variety of better quality goods, is an apt illustration of the situation.

"Has the Party . . . intentionally created such a situation to develop a stronger economic potential, or is this the result of fixed uniform prices throughout the country? Perhaps the state of the market is a result of centralized planning and due to the absence of competition which would create the necessary stimulus. Perhaps the lack of such stimulus prevents industry from producing larger assortments or better quality merchandise. . . . The disproportion created by an insufficiently supplied market, the comparatively high purchasing power of the citizens, and the country's enormous economic potential, is considered to be only a temporary phenomenon . . . which will be overcome in the near future. One gets the impression that efforts are being made in this direction." (Milow Mimica in *Politika* [Belgrade], May 8, 1960.)

An attack on intransigent neo-leftism.

China: "Coexistence Is a Nuisance . . ."

PEIPING: RECENTLY, and particularly since the breakdown of the Paris Conference, Peiping has directed all of its propaganda against Yugoslavia. It is as futile to react to the insults appearing in articles of the biggest papers, where designations such as 'rabid dogs of imperialism' are featured in six-column heads, as it is to refute their fabrications . . . such as the assertion that 'Yugoslav revisionists wholeheartedly help US imperialism.' . . .

"It is not the smokescreen of this barrage which matters, but the target, the essence of what they wish to say and attain.

"In a recent speech in Peiping, Premier Chou En-lai formulated the essence . . . as follows: 'The struggle of the working class in the world aims at unmasking the contemporary revisionist traitors.' Shen Yen-ping, Minister of Culture, explained to a Culture and Education Shockworkers' Congress: 'The contemporary revisionists, proclaiming so-called active coexistence, spread illusions about bourgeois

peace and bourgeois humanitarianism.' The *People's Daily*, organ of the Party Central Committee, added that: 'The Yugoslav revisionists spread the idea of a reconciliation between the enemies and ourselves,' and claim that 'no distinction should be made between us and the enemies, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.'

"These examples, taken from the press . . . in only the last few days, clearly reveal the essence of this 'class attitude' in international politics, as they proudly call their position in Peiping. First and foremost, the idea and practice of peaceful coexistence is a nuisance to that 'class policy.' . . . And precisely because Yugoslavia, a symbol of peace-loving aspiration and practice, has become the victim of propaganda aggression, it is possible to see that the attacks directed at our country are not addressed only to it. This is confirmed by the Chinese policy of exacerbation on the eve of the summit conference, by the clearly expressed disbelief in the possibility of attaining any positive results at the conference. . . . But here too we shall use only the latest, post-Paris material. *Red Flag*, the Party theoretical journal, begins its analysis of the world situation after the failure of the summit conference with the following statement: 'During the last few months, several encouraging changes have taken place in the world.' This is where the writer sees change: 'Because certain imperialists, such as Eisenhower, told empty tales of peace, some people thought he was making great efforts to insure peace. Some people said that the imperialists also took some steps . . . to lessen international tensions. . . . Facts clearly show that to think Eisenhower, Herter and people like them constitute a sensible group is simply wishful thinking divorced of class realities.' . . . So, to this 'analyst' the collapse of every thought of negotiations means 'encouraging changes.' Probably, the vice-chairman of the Chinese trade unions went farthest when he declared at an international trade union rally in Peiping that the basic aim of the new Soviet disarmament proposal was to 'unmask the imperialists' and that it would be 'illusory to indulge in the idea that such a proposal can be implemented while imperialism exists.'

"These, and innumerable other attacks and 'lessons' are undoubtedly not directed at Yugoslavia as an individual country. Their target is all the peace-loving forces in the world. Such attacks, allegedly classminded and anti-imperialist, are ultimately completely identical with the endeavors of the most reactionary imperialist circles engaged in a violent struggle against coexistence . . . and sabotaging anything that might lead to a lessening of tension in the international arena." (*Vjesnik* [Zagreb], June 17, 1960.)

Current Developments

INTERNATIONAL:	<i>Romanian Party Congress, attended by top leaders from other Communist countries, is overshadowed by efforts to heal an international schism (p. 3).</i>
POLITICAL:	<i>Czechoslovak Party Conference approves draft of the country's new constitution and sets higher targets for the Third Five Year Plan (p. 35).</i>
ECONOMIC:	<i>Polish Party Central Committee hears Gomulka call for a higher rate of industrial growth—at the expense of housing and living standards (p. 38).</i>
	<i>Hungarian regime faces labor shortage on its new collective farms (p. 40).</i>

AREAWIDE

West Blamed for Congo Crisis

The collapse of public order in the former Belgian colony of the Congo, following independence day, June 30, gave the Soviet bloc opportunities to castigate the Western "imperialists." Belgian military forces, sent to the Congo to protect Belgian citizens, were accused of "organizing riots in order to justify a second occupation." (Radio Sofia, July 15.) The most vocal attacks emanated from Prague where Premier Viliam Siroky, at a reception honoring the visiting Indonesian First Deputy Premier, declared that "the brazen military intervention of Belgian troops in the young, independent Congo Republic" had been organized "under the patronage of the North Atlantic Pact and with the active support of West Germany." (Radio Prague, July 15.) Warsaw Radio, July 17, stated that "the Americans are supporting the Belgians in order to protect their own interests in the Congo." The dispatching of United Nations' forces by vote of the Security Council was interpreted as due primarily to Soviet demands. Echoing Soviet Premier Khrushchev's July 15 warning that the USSR would take "effective measures" to force Belgian military withdrawal if the UN force failed to halt "aggression," the Satellites offered the Congolese government "all possible aid and support."

In an official government statement, Czechoslovakia provided the following explanation of events:

"The real cause of the armed aggression against the Congo is the fact that Belgian, American, British and West German monopolies . . . refuse to give up their

political and economic position in an effort to prevent the immense Congo wealth from getting into the hands of the Congolese people. . . . As a result, the tension in the country is increasing, the occupation troops are terrorizing the people of the Congo, massacring Congolese citizens, and even threatening the lives of the leading representatives of the Congolese State." (Radio Prague, July 16.)

Disarmament Conference Collapse

After 47 sessions in Geneva, the ten-nation disarmament talks were abruptly broken off when the five Communist delegates (from the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania) walked out on June 27. The Soviet representative Valerian A. Zorin announced that the Communists would take up the disarmament question at the next session of the United Nations in September. He accused the West of "being more interested in espionage than disarmament." The main issue in dispute was the Communist insistence on a treaty of total disarmament along the lines of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's plan as presented before the UN in September 1959; the Western nations continued to insist on a program of gradual disarmament.

The East European nations were apparently taken by surprise. Two days before the walkout, the Budapest Party organ *Nepszabadsag* declared that the "Soviet peace policy" was progressing slowly despite "Western reluctance," and that this progress was signified by the parallel negotiations on atomic disarmament, also going on in Geneva. Once the collapse had taken place, however, the Hungarian press did an about-face: the Westerners were accused of "sabotaging" the conference, explained by the fact that "imperial-

ism does not give up the use of the instrument of war." (*Nepszava* [Budapest], June 29.)

This point of view was faithfully repeated by the Party press in all the other East European nations, the Warsaw daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, June 28, for example, calling the disarmament talks "a shield for the West . . . behind which the adventurous circles were preparing their plots on how to stall the United Nations resolution on disarmament." Mass meetings were soon organized throughout the Soviet bloc to explain the "provocative actions of the United States" which "torpedoed" the Geneva negotiations.

Reaction to Cancelled Visit

When student riots forced Japanese Premier Kishi to cancel American President Eisenhower's scheduled visit, the Soviet bloc press did not contain its joy. Attacks on American foreign policy which had been steadily mounting since the summit failure in May were renewed with great vigor. The Polish Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 17, termed the cancelled tour "an inescapable result of the policies which led to the destruction of the spirit of Camp David and the bankrupt policy of negotiations from positions of strength."

The Japanese fiasco was viewed in the same light as Khrushchev's cancellation of Eisenhower's trip to the USSR, the Prague daily *Rude Pravo*, June 18, claiming that "twice the doors have been slammed in the American President's face . . . because of the general and increasing disagreement of the broad masses of the peoples of all countries . . . with American foreign policy." In this tone the other East European commentators linked the fate of the Japanese Premier with that of the recently deposed Syngman Rhee of South Korea and Adnan Menderes of Turkey as evidence of "the wrath of the masses" (*Radio Sofia*, June 20), and predicted the dissolution of "the America military alliance system, particularly in Asia." (*Magyar Nemzet* [Budapest], June 18.)

No Communes for East Germany

At an East German agricultural exposition, the Communist Chinese delegate reputedly stated that he admired the East German collectivization program which had led in his own country to the people's communes—"the highest form of collective." Commenting on this remark, the East German Party organ *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), June 17, stated flatly:

"We welcome the Chinese People's Republic . . . but we do not intend to state our position on this display of the people's commune in the Chinese pavilion, because this is up to the Chinese . . . government. We must reject, however, attempts to give an impression that the road followed by China . . . can be applied to other countries. The Soviet Union as well as the European people's democracies have strengthened and developed the [collectives] . . . we must not give the impression that we in [East Germany] intend to establish people's communes."

This unusual statement of difference was a reflection of the Soviet Union's refusal to let the Chinese Communists get away with claims that because they have organized communes they are in an advanced stage of Communism.



"To water or not to water."

Szpilki (Warsaw), July 3, 1960

Yugoslav Relations

Taking up Soviet Premier Khrushchev's lead in attacking Yugoslav policy at the Bucharest Party Congress (see page 4), the Soviet propagandists, although chary of invective, condemned Yugoslavia's "neutralist" and "non-bloc" position. Radio Moscow, June 28, assailed Belgrade's participation in the Balkan Pact (with Turkey and Greece) as evidence of the "aggressive nature" of Tito's foreign policy posture. In another broadcast, July 4, Tito's program for "building Socialism" was termed "erroneous" and a denial of Marxist-Leninist theses.

Belgrade, however, refused to engage in a duel of epithets. The Belgrade daily *Politika*, June 25, declared mildly that every Yugoslav must be "surprised" at Khrushchev's denial of the "non-bloc character" of Yugoslav foreign policy in his speech at the Romanian Congress, June 21. Accusing Belgrade of being linked to NATO was in "obvious disharmony" with the "whole tone and content" of Khrushchev's speech, the journal concluded, since "one cannot advocate coexistence and in the same breath attack the peaceful, non-bloc policy of Yugoslavia."

Similarly, an article in Belgrade's English-language *Review of International Affairs*, July 2, pointed out the "inconsistencies" between the Soviet leader's condemnation of Yugoslavia's Balkan relations and his refusal to aggravate the cold war after the Paris summit collapse. Without

discussing Khrushchev's updating of Lenin's theories in specific terms, the *Review* went on to laud Khrushchev's insistence in Bucharest that war is no longer inevitable as long as "imperialism" exists; at the same time the article castigated "some quarters" (i.e., the Chinese Communists) who tried to prove that "notwithstanding the changed historical conditions . . . the very nature of imperialism must cause aggression and wars."

Belgrade was tougher toward the continuing spate of Communist Chinese assaults on "Yugoslav revisionism." The organ of the Yugoslav trade unions called the Chinese campaign against Yugoslavia "unprincipled" and the result of a theory that war is the gravedigger of capitalism and the instrument of the victory of "Socialism." According to Belgrade, "the Chinese 'fighters against imperialism' and the most reactionary, crusading forces in the West, otherwise . . . the fiercest enemies, are actually allies, supplying each other with arguments for undermining all the efforts which

are being made for peace." (Radio Belgrade, June 17.)

Albanian Fire

No matter what the state of the USSR-Yugoslavia relationship, Albanian Communists regularly erupt with harsh words for their neighbors, the "Yugoslav revisionists." Politburo member Hysni Kapo, in a speech before collective farm workers, June 16, labelled Tito a "traitor," "enemy of our people," and "enemy of the Soviet Union as well as of Socialism and Communism." (Radio Tirana, June 17.)

Notwithstanding Moscow's recent attacks on "left-wing sectarianism," Tirana has continued to castigate "revisionism" as the "most formidable danger" to the Communist Parties today. As the chief of contemporary revisionism, the "traitor Tito" was "unmasked" in an article in the Party organ *Zeri i Popullit*, June 29:

"There was a reason why Dulles loved Tito . . . there is also a reason why US Under Secretary of State Dillon loves

ART AS A WEAPON

China's Radio Peiping broadcast the following poem to its English-language audience on June 20. Dedicated to President Eisenhower, it is called: "Aim at the Demon of Plague! Fire!" (Music):

Angry waves toss and foam in the Strait of Taiwan,
Across them a hurricane of awesome fury screams,
The heavens answer and the earth reels,
Mountains and seas shout amid stabs of lightning. (Music)
Heroic guns speak and thunder, heroic fighters roar their battle cry:

Eisenhower go home! Fire! (Roar of cannon)
U. S. aggressors, get out of Taiwan! Fire! (Roar of cannon)

Get out of South Korea! Fire! (Roar of cannon)
Get out of Japan! Fire! (Roar of cannon)
Get out of the Philippines! Fire! (Roar of cannon)
Get out of South Vietnam! Fire! (Roar of cannon)
Get out of the West Pacific! Fire! (Roar of cannon)
We shall liberate Taiwan, pearl of our motherland! Fire! (Roar of cannon)

Down with U. S. imperialism! Fire! (Roar of cannon)
Fire! (Roar of cannon) Fire! (Roar of cannon)
Blast away at the demon of plague! At the savage marauder!

At the world's public enemy number one! At the arch criminal of war!

In June 1950 the U. S. occupied Taiwan by force of arms;
In June 1960 the U. S. tentacles still grip our island.

Oh Taiwan, glistening pearl of the motherland, today
mired in slime and smeared with blood!

Oh gem of the motherland, engulfed in a sea of flames,
victim of calamity after calamity!

Sisters of Taiwan, gazing on the motherland through a veil of tears!

Brothers of Taiwan, igniting leaping flames of hatred!
As of old stand Taiwan's volcanoes. Today they rumble.
Injustices have their author, debts their maker, debts of blood only blood can pay.

Brothers and sisters of Taiwan!

At your side are 600 million countrymen and the mighty sinews of our armed forces!

Listen! (Roar of cannon) Thousands upon thousands of cannon speak, shaking the earth,

(Roar of voices) Thunderous roars issue from millions of throats,

Striking fear into the demon of plague, causing the war criminals to quake and shudder! (Continuing roar of voices)

Let them understand, the Chinese people are not lightly to be provoked.

Our land is not to be violated!

Angry waves toss and foam in the straits of Taiwan,
Across them a hurricane of awesome fury screams,
For our brothers and sisters in Taiwan, fire! (Roar of cannon)

For martyred blood on Tokyo streets, fire! (Roar of cannon)

For blazing hearths in Seoul and Pusan, fire! (Roar of cannon)

For the just struggle of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples,

Aim well at Eisenhower, at U. S. imperialism, fire! (Roar of cannon)

Fire! (Roar of cannon) Fire! (Roar of cannon).

him. . . . The most savage enemies of Communism—like Dulles used to be and like Dillon now—wholeheartedly support, encourage and embrace the traitor Tito."

In response to the intemperate Albanians, the Yugoslavs were muted or spoke in pained tones of the passing of an era of cooperation with Albania after the Second World War when the Yugoslav Communists organized the Albanian Communist Party and the Albanian "National Liberation Army." "Nobody could have dreamed," said Yugoslav Vice President Rankovic, July 3, "that this finest page in the history of Yugoslav-Albanian relations would ever be used in a way which did not correspond to the interests either of our people or of the Albanian people." (Radio Belgrade, July 3.)

Eastern Europe Cautious

Most of the East European nations did their best to keep the peace. While there were occasional references to "revisionism," the word was often used without its customary adjective, "Yugoslav." Only Czechoslovakia burst out angrily against Belgrade's "distortions of Leninist teachings" (see below).

A scientific agreement was signed between Sofia and Belgrade, June 21, and friendly talks were held between Hungarian and Yugoslav trade unionists in Budapest, June 26-27.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Party Conference

At the Third National Party Conference (the Second was in June 1956) meeting in Prague, July 5-7, the drafts of the new constitution and the Third Five Year Plan were approved with "great enthusiasm." Speaking to the Conference, First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny revealed that due to the "victory of the Socialist order in our fatherland," the Czechoslovak People's Republic would become the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. A change in the State emblem incorporating a five-point star as "the symbol of the victory of Socialism" was also announced.

In his discussion of the policy of peaceful coexistence, Novotny declared that there were two possibilities—"coexistence or war"—and that "we are convinced that our strength enables us to achieve complete victory by peaceful means." Ideologically, the Party chieftain hewed to Khrushchev's "middle way": "Our Communist Party will uphold the position of Marxism-Leninism firmly, and . . . fight consistently against revisionist and dogmatic distortions." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], July 6.)

Industry "To Surpass Western Europe"

"There is no doubt that in the course of the Third Five-Year Plan [1961-1965] Czechoslovakia will virtually surpass all West European capitalist countries in per capita industrial production," State Planning chief Otakar Simunek told the conferees. Moreover, he estimated that labor pro-



Young gymnasts marching through Prague during the Second National Spartakiad. The mass exercises, a Communist substitute for the old Sokol Rallies, lasted from June 23 to July 3 and drew 800,000 participants.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), July 2, 1960

ductivity in Czechoslovak industry already exceeds that of Great Britain and France, and "in the very near future" will overtake the level of West Germany. These prognostications introduced a discussion of the country's economic progress by Simunek in which many of the economic sights for the Third Five Year Plan, set forth by Party directives late last fall (see *East Europe*, December 1959, p. 49), had been modified upwards.

During the Plan to be launched next year, industrial production will be "at least 56 percent" higher than in 1960, in place of the originally proposed 50.8 percent. Most of this additional increase is expected from the capital goods industry whose target was raised from 60 to 70 percent, while the goal for consumer goods was only revised from 30 to 34 percent. A total of 322 billion *koruny* will be spent on investment, the planning chief said, instead of the 312 billion forecast last fall. The target for national income was left unchanged. The following table is a comparison between the planned percentage increases (or physical targets) originally proposed for selected key industrial sectors and those given by Simunek. Only the target for coal production was lowered:

		Old Targets	New Targets
Machine-building	percent	72	76
Pig iron	million tons	7.6	7.7
Steel	million tons	10.5	10.6
Building construction	percent	36	41

		Old Targets	New Targets
Food industry	percent	26	30
Electric power	billion kwh.	37.7	39.0
Brown coal	million tons	73.2	70.2
Hard coal	million tons	35.5	31.4

The planning chief devoted a considerable portion of his report to the countryside. Although he called attention to the gap existing between industrial and agricultural production—which reached serious proportions in 1959 with a 1.4 percent drop in agricultural output—the target cited was also slightly above the one originally set forth by the Party, a 22.8 percent increase instead of 21 percent. Referring to the collectivization drive, which has brought a little over 86 percent of the agricultural land into the “Socialist sector” at the present time, Simunek gave the figure of 90 percent for the end of 1960; the process is to be completed in the early years of the coming Plan. The usual obeisance was made to “economic cooperation between the Socialist countries” by pointing to the increased turnover of foreign trade; but on the matter of intra-bloc investments, which affects Czechoslovakia directly as a supplier of capital to the less developed Communist countries, the planning chief was silent.

Party Membership Up

Politburo candidate Jan Hlina reported that Party members and candidate-members now totalled 1,559,082, an increase of 136,883 since the Eleventh Party Congress in June 1958. The length of the period of candidacy has been reduced to one year for everyone; previously, the intelligentsia were required to serve a two-year apprenticeship, while manual workers needed only one year. This change was effected “with a view to the class changes in our society and the strengthening of the moral and political unity of the people.” (*Rude Pravo*, July 8.)

The Party statutes were changed to allow the Communist Party of Slovakia to hold its Congresses every four years as does the national Party, rather than every two years, as before.

“No German Minority”

The new Constitution guarantees a certain measure of cultural autonomy for the following ethnic minorities—Hungarians, Ukrainians and Poles. According to President Novotny, “the citizens of German nationality in Czechoslovakia” no longer form “an ethnic group.” Nevertheless, there are approximately 160,000 German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, about the same amount as the total number of Ukrainians and Poles. Deputy Premier Vaclav Kopecky explained the omission of the German minority as the consequence of the Potsdam agreement of 1945. Immediately after the war, the Sudeten Germans “were transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany, as they had always wanted,” said Kopecky: “The Sudeten Germans . . . accordingly have not lost a homeland as they now claim but on the contrary . . . regained their national German homeland. It is a historical fact when we proclaim that the question of a German nationality in our country has

ceased to exist.” He then stressed that those Germans who had remained in Czechoslovakia enjoyed the same civil rights as all other citizens, but as a group they have “completely dispersed and live individually in different areas of the Czech national community.” (*Rude Pravo*, July 8.)

Yugoslavia Assailed

Although an uneasy truce in the Soviet bloc-Yugoslav “cold war” has endured for the past few months, Premier Viliam Siroky strongly castigated the Yugoslav economy and “Yugoslav revisionism” in his major address before the conference. “The Yugoslav revisionists,” he said, “are distorting Lenin’s teachings on the withering away of the State, thus trying to justify their revisionist policy. In the name of the withering away of the State, they reject the principle of uncontrolled development of national economy. . . . What we see in Yugoslavia are, in fact, strong symptoms of the weakening and deformation of the Socialist State . . . and increasing dependence on credits and gifts from imperialist States.” (*Rude Pravo*, July 8.)

Resolution Voted


In the conference resolution, Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s fight against “left wing dogmatism” was endorsed. In essence the resolution repeated Siroky’s words supporting peaceful coexistence, but stipulated that “the aggressive acts of the West German revanchists” would never be tolerated, a standard threat of the Czechoslovak Party. (*Rude Pravo*, July 8.)

Cabinet Shuffle

With the seating of a new Assembly, July 9, a new cabinet was appointed by President Antonin Novotny. Four Ministers-Without-Portfolio have been named rather than the one with this title in the old cabinet, but due to the merger of other ministries and the disappearance of cabinet-rank committees the cabinet has been reduced from 31 to 30 members.

The Ministries of Fuel and Power have been merged, and with this move, Antonin Posposil, former Minister of Power and Water Conservation, was dropped. The Ministry of Communication was merged with the Ministry of Transportation. The Governmental Committee for the Development of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Conservation has been eliminated, necessitating the dismissal of Dr. Jozef Kysely; the State Committee for Technical Development has likewise been abolished, and Vaclav Ouzky, Minister-Chairman, was relieved. The death of Dr. Emanuel Slechta, Minister-Chairman of the State Construction Committee, March 17, had left this post open, and last May the government abolished the Committee. The title of First Deputy Premier has also disappeared; the only man to hold it, Dr. Jaromir Dolansky, has been made simply a Deputy Premier.

Former Minister of Communications Dr. Alois Neuman has replaced Dr. Vaclav Sloda as Minister of Justice. Vaclav Cerny, Minister of Foundries and Ore Mines, was



On top, the new emblem of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The five-point Communist star and contours of a Slovak mountain and a flame replace the crown and Slovak cross on the old 1916 emblem below.

replaced by Miroslav Smok, a Deputy Minister. Josef Jonas, Minister of Fuel, was succeeded by Oldrich Cernik, a Secretary of the Party Central Committee.

New Ministers

A new Deputy Premier was Rudolf Strechaj, Chairman of the former Slovak Board of Commissioners. Two other

former members of the Board of Commissioners were named Ministers-Without-Portfolio: Vasil Bilak and Pavol Majling; the latter was Chairman of the Slovak Planning Commission. Stanislav Vlana, the third new Minister-Without-Portfolio, is a First Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], July 12.)

Radio-TV Under Fire

The "political-ideological standards" of the Czechoslovak radio and television industry were severely criticized by the Party Central Committee recently. Specifically, the news programs were reproached for their presentation of foreign policy and their "all-State" coverage, i.e., that in Slovakia, Czech affairs have been slighted and vice versa. The Central Committee stressed the necessity for the television industry to work "in a clearly defined Communist spirit" and to express clearly "the principles which guide our Socialist society." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], June 15.)

On June 25, the Party organ carried another article devoted in the main to radio. Here, too, the news reporting was scolded for showing "a lack of connection with the concrete tasks which Marxism-Leninism demands." Both radio and TV were censured for "the low standard of their entertainment programs." Dance music in particular was characterized as "sentimental" and "remote . . . from the life of the progressive people of our generation, their optimism and confidence." Above all, it was demanded that radio be a useful propaganda tool with which to publicize the Third Five Year Plan and to fight for higher productivity, especially in agriculture.

Drive to Raise Farm Production

In an effort to do something about Czechoslovakia's stagnant agriculture, the Party Central Committee has inaugurated a campaign to fulfill the agricultural targets in the Third Five Year Plan (1961-1965) in four years. The drive, which was tied to the National Party Conference which opened July 5 in Prague, began with a letter to all the Party's local organizations, May 22.

Vratislava Krutina, a secretary of the CC, appraised the progress of the campaign in an article in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), on June 24. He wrote that only 360 pledges had been received, and that the results were "not entirely satisfactory." Some of the pledges "contained certain shortcomings stemming from a formalistic approach." He cautioned Party workers not to assume that the undertaking was "only a one-time campaign." The effort is to extend over the entire period of the Five Year Plan, and its chief aim is to insure deliveries to the state of the largest possible quantities of produce, particularly grain, milk, meat and eggs, above the planned targets.

Youth League Changes

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Youth League in Prague, June 9, chairman Miroslav Vecker was replaced by a member of the Secretariat, Vladimir Vedra. Another secretary, Vladimir Meisner, was removed from his post; no new assignments were announced for Vecker or Meisner. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], June 10.)



The new political boss of the Polish Army is 37-year-old Major General W. Jaruzelski, left, shown with Minister of Defense Marian Spychalski. He joined the Party in 1943, served with the Red Army in the war, and until recently was in command of a mechanized division. He is now Chief of the Main Political Administration.

Magazyn Ilustrowany (Warsaw), Nov. 24, 1960

POLAND

Fifth Plenum Revises Plan

Austerity seemed to be the keynote of the economic program discussed at the fifth plenary meeting of the Central Committee, June 21-24. The governing body of the Polish Party approved changes in the draft of the Second Five Year Plan (1961-1965) that will raise the amount to be invested in industry and agriculture and decrease the amount to be spent on housing, retail trade and local government services. First Secretary Gomulka argued that the long-run needs of the Polish economy make it imperative that the State put more of its resources into economic growth.

Total investment outlays will be set at 560-565 billion *zloty*, or 25-30 billion more than originally proposed at the Third Party Congress in March 1959.* Net investment will rise to 20 percent of the national income in 1965 rather than the 18.5 percent originally projected. More significant, how-

* The original figure was 514 billion *zloty* in 1958 prices; the new total is calculated in 1959 prices.

ever, is a shift in the structure of investment which puts more emphasis on production and less on consumption. A comparison of the new investment program with the one originally proposed, and also with that of the years 1956-1960, looks as follows:*

	1956-60	1961-65 original	1961-65 original	1961-65 revised
Total (billion <i>zloty</i>)	345.3	514.4	535	565
Percent going to:				
Industry	39.0	36.8	37.7	38.7
Agriculture	13.4	13.8	13.4	15.8
Forestry	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5
Building	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.5
Transportation and communication	9.0	9.1	9.2	9.7
Housing	21.4	24.0	23.1	19.2
Municipalities	4.1	4.4	4.3	4.0
Internal trade	2.7	2.2	2.1	2.0
Social and cultural	6.2	6.4	6.5	6.6
Other	1.5	0.7	0.7	1.0
Reserve	—	—	—	2.7-3.5

The revised program also calls for a higher rate of industrial growth, averaging 8.7 percent annually as against 8.5 percent, with a total increase over the five years of 52 percent rather than 50 percent as originally envisaged. Figures for key items are as follows (in millions of tons):

	1960 planned	1965 original	1965 revised
Electric power (billion kwh)	29.0	43.5-45	45.5
Coal (million tons)	103.5	112-113	113.6
Crude steel	6.57	9.0	9.3
Rolled steel	4.4	6.05	6.38
Sulfuric acid	0.68	1.14	1.32
Cement	6.6	10.0	11.12

The Argument

In advocating these politically delicate revisions, Gomulka told the Central Committee that the Polish economy was better than some critics have contended. The rate of growth over the decade 1950-1959 compared favorably, he said, with that in other countries of the Soviet bloc: in Poland it had averaged 14.5 percent annually as against 12 percent for the USSR, 10.9 percent for Czechoslovakia, 11.7 percent for Hungary, 13 percent for East Germany, 13.6 percent for Romania, 15.2 percent for Bulgaria and 20.5 percent for Albania. Since 1955, however, the Polish rate of growth had dropped to 9.4 percent as the Polish regime cut back on investment in heavy industry and tried to raise living standards.

The agricultural sector, on the other hand, had been lagging; total output in 1959 had been only 17.5 percent above the average achieved in the prewar years of 1934-1938. The lag in agriculture had contributed to Poland's foreign exchange difficulties, for in place of the old grain exports the country is now forced to import considerable

* Figures in the first two columns are based on data in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 22, 1959, and the third and fourth columns from *Trybuna Ludu*, June 24, 1960. The first two columns are in terms of 1958 prices, and the third and fourth in 1959 prices.

quantities of grain and fodder. This means that in coming years the State must invest more in agriculture than it had in the past.

Poland's rapidly expanding population, Gomulka said, posed the problem of finding productive employment for all the new hands. As technology advances, he said, the investment necessary to create additional jobs also rises, since each expansion in industrial capacity involves more machinery and fewer men. "We shall be faced with the increasingly urgent question: While investing in industry, is it necessary to invest in technological progress and thus in higher productivity, or is it necessary to invest from the standpoint of employing the most people?" He added that this problem would increase in difficulty between 1966 and 1970.

"In our investment policy we must always be motivated by the principle of technological progress in industry, particularly in the heavy and machinery industries. Nevertheless, we shall be faced with the need to invest also with a view to increasing employment even at the cost of technological progress. . . .

"Against the backdrop of the problem of employing an increasing population, we have the glaringly total ignorance of reality shown by high church dignitaries, who adamantly oppose birth control and proclaim that Poland should have 80 million people [an allusion to a recent statement by Cardinal Wyszynski, who said that Poland had the resources to support "50 or even 80 million inhabitants"—Ed.]. To feed 80 million people at present living standards we should have to raise yields of the four chief grains to 40.5 quintals per hectare, or to import some 26 million tons of grain annually. . . . If church dignitaries can find miraculous resources which will help us achieve gigantic indexes of increased production, then we shall become ardent advocates of an 80-million nation. But there are no miracles, and church dignitaries leave the nation's care to us and consider themselves free of this responsibility."

Cutback in Housing

What this would mean for the 23-percent increase in living standards contained in the original draft of the Five Year Plan was not made clear. Gomulka said that "it is impossible to give a definite answer to this question," because it depended on many different factors, but concluded that there was no reason to be pessimistic. "Calculations show that increases in per capita consumption will probably be higher than 20 percent and should shape up to around 23 percent during the Five Year Plan."

But the funds allotted to housing, one of Poland's most distressing problems, are to be reduced by 15 billion *zloty* during the Plan. Gomulka said that the reduction in State investment in housing would have to be compensated by an increase in private investment through housing cooperatives, and that the revision did not mean that fewer apartments would be built than had been originally planned. He pointed out that State subsidies in housing—particularly in the form of abnormally low rents—were greater than in most other Communist countries. He also maintained that building costs were higher than necessary. Nevertheless, the cut in funds was bound to be received with dismay by the Polish public. The liberal economic weekly *Zycie Gospo-*



A Polish magazine for young people, *Radar* (Warsaw), specializes in encouraging "pen-pals" from all over the world. It carries pages of names and sometimes pictures of would-be correspondents, giving their ages interests and languages. Interspaced with these are a few articles with political import, on such subjects as "Colonialism" and "German expansionism," but these are far outshadowed by the lists of get-togetherness. Above, a sample pen-pal in the No. 4, 1960 issue, Miss Birgitta Ruthstrom, 17, of Stockholm; she understands English and Russian and likes "music and horses, cars and clothes, drawing and painting."

darce had criticized the impending move in its issue of May 22, stating that measures to improve the housing situation "affect the consciousness of the population, especially the youth, to a much greater extent than all the other measures aimed at improving the standard of living."

Criticizes Comecon

Gomulka also indicated that the Poles are far from satisfied with the present state of economic cooperation among the Soviet bloc countries. This is carried on under the aegis of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (see Texts and Documents), an organization which is usually spoken of in the highest terms. He implied that Poland would find it easier to solve its investment problems if it got more assistance from other Communist countries, particularly from the other Satellites.

"The present broad cooperation in the economic field affects in fact only a sector of foreign trade and, to some extent, a sector of technology. On the other hand, mutual cooperation is practically nonexistent in such an important field as that of investments.

"In this respect, the maxim 'everybody for himself' still prevails, and this harms everybody. I do not want to probe into the reasons for this state of affairs, but there is no doubt that one of the most important tasks in expanding the mutual cooperation of Socialist countries is to coordinate their investment operations in industry.

"The sooner this is done, the more we shall gain. As it is, all the Socialist countries have already lost much because of a lack of such coordination in the past. Bilateral agreements, or agreements between three or more parties, in the field of mutual investment in industry, would result in outstanding improvements in the effectiveness of investments and would make it possible to choose those directions of investment operations which are most proper for every country. This is a pressing matter which should be tackled as soon as possible." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], June 22.)

Increase in Wholesale Prices

Effective July 1, new prices were introduced for basic raw materials, machinery and electric power, and freight rates were raised by 20 percent. The changes will not affect the prices paid by consumers. The reform represents an effort to rationalize the price system, which had become so distorted over the years that the prices of basic industrial goods bore little relation to their real costs. The new prices are expected to allow producers to cover their costs with an average profit of five percent, whereas in the past many industrial sectors had large bookkeeping losses. The income of the railroads will increase by 77 percent. (Radio Warsaw, July 1.)

Wages Increase

Reporting before the Tenth Plenum of the Central Council of Polish Trade Unions in Warsaw, July 29-30, chairman Ignacy Loga-Sowinski announced that during the past four years, workers' minimum wages have risen from 360 to 600 *zloty* per month. The average earnings in industry are now 1,625 *zloty*, although 16.9 percent of the workers are still earning no more than 1,000 *zloty* monthly, a situation which must be "improved" in the near future. Discussing the work of the Party-backed workers' self-government organizations, Loga-Sowinski declared that they now exist in 11,500 enterprises. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], July 1.)

Defector Condemned

A former Polish military attache in Washington, Colonel Pawel Monat, who defected to the West in 1959, was tried in absentia and sentenced to death by a district military court in Warsaw, according to the Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 19. Monat is the second of the East European military attaches to defect to the West in recent years; in 1958 a Czechoslovak, Colonel Tislar, was granted political asylum by the United States.

Polish-East German Celebration

A Polish delegation headed by Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz visited Magdeburg for a rally July 6, honoring the tenth anniversary of the signing of the agreement on the demarcation of the present German-Polish frontier. In a

BABIES AND HOUSES

"It appears that the birthrate in Poland in the last three months was the lowest in 10 years. It was 13.8 per 1,000 inhabitants. It is still a high birthrate, one of the highest in the world. . . . And more statistical items related to the one above. We build, yearly, five new apartments per 1,000 inhabitants. And there are nine newly married couples for each 1,000 inhabitants."

Przekroj (Cracow), May 1, 1960

welcoming speech, East German Deputy Premier Willi Stoph harshly attacked "West German militarism and revanchism" and vowed that the "West German revanchists will never succeed in carrying out their plans for the conquest of [East Germany], People's Poland and the Czechoslovak Republic." In reply, Cyrankiewicz hailed the "solidarity" between the two "Socialist States" and urged implementation of the Soviet proposals for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German States "and consequent settlement of the acute West Berlin problem." (Radio [East] Berlin, July 5.)

Stalinist Promoted

Characteristic of Gomulka's retreat from the liberal gains of the "Polish October" has been the return of the old Stalinists such as General ("Gaspip") Witaszewski and the former Polish Ambassador to Moscow, Tadeusz Gede, to positions of power; now, Boleslaw Ruminski, a cabinet minister during the Stalinist period, has been appointed chairman of the Central Technological Organization. In his new post he will control the work of 160,000 technological specialists and will be greatly concerned with the revision of norms and with industrial investment policies. Ruminski had held this same post in 1950-51. Until his new appointment, he was Deputy Minister of Food Industry and Supplies.

HUNGARY

Peasant Apathy and the Harvest

With the harvest underway, the official press has been full of pronouncements which suggest that there is apathy on the part of the newly collectivized peasantry, along with a general shortage of labor. The peasant is holding out for an urban-type eight hour day, according to *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), July 5, which said that few of the peasants want to work as long and as hard as they did when they possessed their own land. On the following day, the Party daily announced an extreme measure. Collectives with a labor shortage will be permitted to hire workers to bring the harvest in, on conditions similar to those "which ex-

isted for the agrarian proletariat in the old days." While paying lip-service to Communist ideology by cautioning against "material incentives opposing the Socialist principles of distribution," it also suggested a system of "harvesting target premiums" as a means of drawing sufficient manpower to the fields.

Earlier, the farmer's weekly *Szabad Fold* (Budapest), June 6, had warned that "it is wrong to believe that, after having developed the framework of large-scale farming, an eight hour working day can be introduced or that the work of family members can be done away with."

Small Artisans Get Tax Concession

Small artisans who now live or who will settle in villages with a population under 5,000 will be given a one year exemption from general income tax upon acquiring a license to perform repair and service work. (*Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), June 17.) This move is calculated to relieve the drastic shortage of small artisans in the smaller villages which resulted from the recent collectivization campaigns. Under pressure to organize into cooperatives, many left the villages for the larger cities to work in industry.


THINK OF THE WATER YOU SAVE

A letter to the editor of *Zycie Warszawy*, July 3-4, 1960:

"I have received an apartment in a new building. There is room for a bathtub and a stove in the bathroom, but neither has been installed. I was told to try to buy them and install them on my own. Isn't this somebody else's job?"

The editor replies: "We have often written of the material difficulties which confront building activity in Warsaw (and not only Warsaw), and about the shortage of bathtubs and badly functioning gas stoves. We have learned from the Enterprise of Installations and Sanitary Works that the situation with bathtubs is somewhat improved. But we know that the annual demand for tubs (10,800) in Warsaw is only partly satisfied, to the extent of 8,100. Already last year the builders had finished 17 houses without bathtubs. With the exception of the downtown area, all houses in the developments were finished without bathtubs this year (up to April). We should expect more trouble with this problem in the last quarter of the year.

"As far as gas stoves are concerned, the Enterprise of Installation and Sanitary Works installs them exclusively at the demand and upon the responsibility of the investor. Since there are no bathtubs, the investor is not eager to take upon himself the responsibility for the badly functioning stoves. He is surely right in this."



The section chief has just bought himself a dog.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), June 9, 1960

BULGARIA

Harvesting Lags

Despite an unprecedented campaign to insure success in this year's early harvest, progress is running behind schedule. The target period had been late June and early July, but Radio Sofia announced on July 11 that less than 30 percent of the total early harvest area for grain had been brought in.

The drive began with an agricultural conference in Sofia on June 13, and a ministerial decree giving legal sanction to its decision was announced five days later. Harvesting was declared to be the most important nationwide task, time-tables were set up and an organizational campaign was begun to mobilize all able-bodied collective farm members as well as town workers. In the days that followed, both press and radio kept up a continual barrage. Speaking at Varna, Premier Anton Yugov said that there was still not enough sense of urgency and "the necessary mobilization of manpower and agricultural techniques had not been made." He reiterated the statement of the decree that "all kinds of meetings, fairs, excursions and other similar manifestations which divert the working people from the fulfillment of agricultural tasks must be stopped."

Bad weather is held partly to blame. Recent heavy rains have damaged crops and interfered with their gathering. Organization is also said to be insufficient, and machinery and equipment in a bad state of repair. Finally, the collectivized peasants have developed an inclination to work only eight hours a day. Premier Yugov, in his Varna address, complained that "six or eight hours of work will not be sufficient. During the period when agricultural activities are at their peak it is necessary to go to the fields early and work to a late hour. . . . The people say 'a day may decide the food for a year.'" (*Rabotnicheskoto Delo* [Sofia], July 4.)

Private Producers Get Better Prices

One more in a series of decrees directed at encouraging animal breeding on the private plots of collective farm members, and by other private individuals, has been approved by the Council of Ministers, according to Radio

(Continued on page 48)

Texts and Documents

THE COMECON CHARTER

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is an intergovernmental organization which includes all the European Communist countries except Yugoslavia. Its stated purpose is to weld the separate national economies of the Soviet bloc into one commonwealth based on international cooperation and a division of labor, much as the six countries of the West European Common Market are seeking to remove the barriers to trade among themselves. Comecon (or CEMA as it is abbreviated in Russian) was founded in 1949, but did not assume much importance until 1958. At a meeting in Sofia last December, representatives of the member governments (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania and the USSR) signed a Charter setting forth the aims and principles of the organization and establishing its rules.

In a preliminary statement, the signatories declared that they intended to "continue developing mutual cooperation on the basis of . . . the international Socialist division of labor" and affirmed their "readiness to develop economic intercourse with all nations, regardless of their social and governmental systems, on the basis of equality, mutual advantage and noninterference in each other's internal affairs." Article II of the Charter states that "membership in CEMA is open to other European countries which share the aims and principles of the Charter. . . ."

The Charter took effect on April 13, 1960, after it had been formally ratified by the member governments. The complete document is given below, translated from the text published in Izvestia (Sofia), February 23, 1960.

Article I

Aims and Principles

1. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance aims to assist, through the unification and coordination of the efforts of the member-countries of the Council, in the planned development of the national economies, in the speeding up of economic and technical progress in these countries, in raising the level of industrialization of the countries with less developed industry, in the constant increase of labor productivity, and in furthering the welfare of the member-peoples of CEMA.

2. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all member-countries of CEMA.

The economic and scientific-technical cooperation of the member-countries of CEMA is based on the principles of equal rights, respect for national interests, mutual advantage and comradely mutual aid.

Article II

Membership

1. The original members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance are the countries which have signed and ratified this Charter.

2. Admission to membership in CEMA is open to other European countries which share the aims and principles of the Council and agree to accept its Charter obligations.

3. Any member-country may leave the Council after informing the custodian of this Charter (the USSR). Such notice will take effect six months after being received by the custodian. Upon receiving such notice, the custodian will inform the member-countries of the Council.

4. The member-countries of CEMA agree:

a) to carry out the recommendations adopted by them;

b) to render to the Council and its employees the necessary assistance in fulfilling the functions set forth in this Charter;

c) to make available to the Council all material and information necessary for the realization of the tasks entrusted to CEMA;

d) to inform the Council as to the fulfillment of the recommendations adopted by the Council.

Article III

Functions and Rights

1. In conformity with the aims and principles set forth in Article I of this Charter, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance:

a) organizes:

thorough economic and scientific-technical cooperation among the member-countries of the Council for the most rational utilization of their natural resources and for the speeding up of their economic development;

preparation of recommendations on the most important questions of economic relations resulting from the plans for developing the national economies of the member-countries of the Council, with a view to coordinating these plans;

the study of economic problems which are of concern to the member-countries of the Council;

b) assists the member-countries of the Council in developing and implementing joint projects in the field of:

industry and agriculture of the member-countries of the Council, on the basis of a consistent realization of the international Socialist division of labor and the specialization and cooperation of production;

transportation, for insuring, first of all, the growing transportation of export-import and transit freight of the member-countries of the Council;

the most efficient utilization of capital investment made by the member-countries of the Council in projects to be carried out on the basis of joint participation;

the development of international trade and exchange of experience among the member-countries of the Council and with other countries;

the exchange of scientific-technical achievements and of advanced production experience;

c) undertakes other actions necessary for the achievement of the aims of the Council.

2. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, through its organs acting within the bounds of their competence, is authorized to accept recommendations and decisions according to this Charter.

Article IV

Recommendations and Decisions

1. Recommendations are adopted on questions of economic and scientific-technical cooperation. The recommendations are reported for study to the member-countries of the Council.

The implementation of recommendations adopted by the member-countries of the Council is carried out according to the decisions of the Governments or the competent organs of those countries in accordance with their laws.

2. Decisions are adopted on organizational and procedural questions. The decisions take effect, if nothing to the contrary is provided in them, from the day the protocol of the session of the corresponding organ of the Council is signed.

3. All recommendations and decisions in the Council are adopted only with the consent of the member-countries concerned, and each country is entitled to state its position on any question studied in the Council.

The recommendations and decisions do not concern countries which have abstained on a question. However, each of these countries may subsequently join the other member-countries of the Council which have adopted the recommendations and decisions.

Article V

Organs

1. To realize the functions and rights described in Art. III of this Charter, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has the following organs:

Session of the Council;

Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council;

Permanent Commissions;
Secretariat.

2. Other organs, as they prove necessary, may be established according to the Charter.

Article VI

Session of the Council

1. The Session of the Council is the supreme organ of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The Session has the right to study all questions within the competence of the Council, and to adopt recommendations and decisions according to this Charter.

2. The Session of the Council is composed of the delegations of all member-countries of the Council. The composition of the delegation of each country is defined by the Government of the country concerned.

3. The regular Sessions of the Council are convened twice a year in the capitals of the member-countries of the Council, under the chairmanship of the head of the delegation of the country in which the Session takes place.

4. An extraordinary Session of the Council may be convened on the request of not less than one-third of the member-countries of the Council.

5. The Session of the Council:

a) studies:

proposals on economic and scientific-technical cooperation presented by the member-countries of the Council, as well as by the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council, by the Permanent Commissions and the Secretariat of the Council;

the report of the Secretariat of the Council on the activity of the Council;

b) defines the course of action of the other organs of the Council and the basic questions on the agenda of the forthcoming Session of the Council;

c) performs other functions necessary to achieve the aims of the Council;

6. The Session of the Council is entitled to establish those organs which it considers necessary for the fulfillment of the functions entrusted to the Council;

7. The Session of the Council establishes its own procedural regulations.

Article VII

Conference of Representatives of CEMA Countries

1. The Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance is composed of representatives of all the member-countries of the Council—one for each country.

The representative of each CEMA country has a deputy in the staff of the Secretariat, the necessary advisers, and other staff. The deputy is authorized to perform the functions of representative in the Conference.

2. The Conference has sessions whenever necessary.

3. The Conference has the right, within the area of its competence, to adopt recommendations and decisions in conformity with the Charter.

The Conference may also introduce proposals for study in the Council Session.

4. The Conference:

a) studies the proposals of member-countries of the Council, of the Permanent Commissions and of the Council Secretariat, on the implementation of recommendations and decisions adopted by the Session of the Council, as well as on matters of economic and scientific-technical cooperation which must be solved in the period between the Council Sessions;

b) studies in advance, if need be, the proposals of the member-countries of the Council, those of the Permanent Commissions and those of the Council Secretariat, which proposals are placed on the agenda for the forthcoming session of the Council;

c) coordinates the work of the Permanent Commissions; studies their reports on their completed work and on their future activity;

d) approves:
the number and salaries of the employees, and the budget of the Council Secretariat, as well as the report of the latter on fulfillment of the budget;

e) establishes control organs for checking the financial activity of the Secretariat of the Council;

f) executes other functions proceeding from this Charter, as well as from the recommendations and decisions of the Session of the Council.

5. The Conference has the right to establish auxiliary organs for preparing questions in advance.

6. The Conference establishes its own procedural regulations.

Article VIII

Permanent Commissions

1. The Permanent Commissions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance are formed by the Session of the Council for the purpose of assisting the further development of economic relations between the member-countries of the Council, and for the organization of many-sided economic and scientific-technical cooperation in the various sectors of the national economies of these countries.

The regulations on the work of the Permanent Commissions are approved by the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council.

2. Each member-country of the Council appoints its representatives to the Permanent Commissions.

3. The Permanent Commissions have the right, within the area of their competence, to accept recommendations and decisions in conformity with the Charter. The Commissions can also introduce proposals for study in the Session of the Council and in the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council.

4. The Permanent Commissions work out projects and prepare proposals for implementing economic and scientific-technical cooperation as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, and fulfill functions proceeding from this Charter and from the recommendations and decisions of the Session of the Council and the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council.

The Permanent Commissions submit yearly reports to the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council on their completed work and on their future activity.

5. The sessions of the Permanent Commissions are carried on, as a rule, in their permanent location, which is determined by the Session of the Council.

6. The Permanent Commissions, when necessary, can establish auxiliary organs. The composition and competence of these organs, as well as the place of their conferences, are determined by the Commissions themselves.

7. Every Permanent Commission has a secretariat, headed by the Commission's secretary. The apparatus of the Commission's secretariat is included in the composition of the Council Secretariat and is financed by its budget.

8. The Permanent Commissions establish their own procedural regulations.

Article IX

Secretariat

1. The Secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is composed of a Secretary of the Council, his deputies, and such personnel as may prove necessary for realization of the functions entrusted to the Secretariat.

The Secretary and his deputies are appointed by the Session of the Council, and conduct the work of the Secretariat of the Council.

The personnel of the Secretariat is composed of citizens from the member-countries of the Council, in conformity with the Regulation regarding the work of the Secretariat of the Council.

The Secretary of the Council is the main person of the Council. He represents the Council before the official persons and organizations of the member-countries of the Council, and other countries, as well as before international organizations.

The Secretary of the Council has the right to authorize his deputies, as well as the Secretariat's staff, to represent him wherever necessary.

The Secretary and his deputies may participate in all conferences of the Council's organs.

2. The Secretariat of the Council:

a) submits a report on the activity of the Council at the regular Session of the Council;

b) helps in the preparation and carrying out of the Session of the Council, the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council, the sessions of the Permanent Commissions of the Council, and the conferences convened on decision of these organs;

c) prepares, on recommendation of the Session of the Council or the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council, economic reports and research on material of the member-countries of the Council, and publishes material on questions of economic and scientific-technical cooperation among these countries;

d) prepares: proposals on questions regarding the work of the Council, for study in the corresponding organs of the Council;

informative and guiding material on questions of economic and scientific-technical cooperation among the member-countries of the Council;

e) organizes jointly with the Permanent Commissions of the Council the documentation of the many agreements

on questions of economic and scientific-technical cooperation, on the basis of the recommendations and decisions of the Session of the Council and the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council;

f) undertakes other actions proceeding from this Charter, the recommendations and decisions adopted by the Council, and those adopted under the Regulation on the activity of the Secretariat of the Council.

3. The Secretary of the Council, his deputies and the personnel of the Secretariat, in fulfilling their obligations toward the Council, act as international official persons.

4. The seat of the Secretariat of the Council is in Moscow.

Article X

Participation of Other Countries in the Work of the Council

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance may invite countries which are not members of the Council to take part in the activity of the organs of the Council.

The conditions under which the representatives of these countries may participate in the work of the organs of the Council are defined by the Council with the agreement of the countries concerned.

Article XI

Relations with International Organizations

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance may establish and maintain relations with United Nations economic organizations and with other international organizations.

The character and forms of these relations are determined by the Council with the consent of the international organizations concerned.

Article XII

Financial Questions

1. The member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance assume the responsibility of financing the Secretariat and its activity. The share of participation in these expenses for each member-country of the Council is determined by the Session of the Council, and other financial questions by the Conference of

Representatives of the Countries in the Council.

2. The Secretariat of the Council submits a report on the fulfillment of the budget for each calendar year to the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council.

3. Expenses for the support of participants in the Session of the Council, in the Conference of Representatives of the Countries in the Council, in the sessions of the Permanent Commissions of the Council, as well as in conferences carried out within the framework of the Council, are assumed by the country which has commissioned representatives for these sessions and conferences.

4. Expenses connected with the sessions and conferences provided in paragraph 3 of this Article are assumed by the country in which these sessions and conferences take place.

Article XIII Various Regulations

1. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance enjoys all legal rights on the territory of each member-country of the Council necessary for the fulfillment of its functions and for achieving its aims.
2. The Council, the representatives of the member-countries of the Council, and the employees of the Council enjoy those privileges and immunities on the territory of each of these countries which are necessary for the fulfillment of the functions and for the achievement of the aims provided in this Charter.
3. The rights, privileges and immunities

provided in this Article are defined by a special Convention.

4. The regulations of this Charter do not affect the rights and obligations of the member-countries of the Council resulting from their membership in other international organizations, as well as from international agreements concluded by them.

Article XIV Language

1. Official languages in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance are the languages of all member-countries of the Council.

2. The language used in the Council is Russian.

Article XV Ratification of the Charter and its Enforcement

1. This Charter is subject to ratification by the countries which have signed it, according to their constitutional procedure.
2. The ratified documents will be delivered to the custodian of this Charter for preservation.
3. The Charter comes into force immediately after the ratified documents of all countries which have signed this Charter are delivered for preservation, at which time the custodian will inform those countries without delay.
4. In respect to any country which under paragraph 2 of Article II of this Charter may be accepted in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and ratifies this

Charter, the latter comes into force from the day that country delivers the ratified document for preservation, at which time the custodian shall inform the other member-countries of the Council.

Article XVI Procedure on Implementation of the Charter

Each member-country of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance may introduce proposals for implementation of this Charter.

Implementations of the Charter approved by the Council Session come into force immediately after the documents of these implementations ratified by all member-countries of the Council are delivered to the custodian for preservation.

Article XVII Concluding Regulations

This Charter is prepared in one copy in the Russian language. The Charter will be deposited for preservation with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The latter will send certified copies of the Charter to the Governments of all other member-countries of the Council, and will inform these Governments and the Council Secretary that the ratified documents have been deposited with the Government of the USSR for preservation.

In witness whereof, the representatives of the Governments of the member-countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance have signed this Charter.

Done in Sofia on December 14, 1959.

Book Review

The Communist Commonwealth

THE SOVIET BLOC, UNITY AND CONFLICT, by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960, 470 pp., \$7.75.

HANS KOHN

IN THE YEAR 1945 the Communist leadership faced an entirely new problem. Despite its federal character, the USSR was a highly centralized nation-State, heir to the Russian Empire, in which for many centuries one will and one historical national tradition alone had dominated. This situation changed fundamentally when Communist regimes were for the first time (disregarding the two short episodes of Budapest and Munich after World War I) established outside the USSR, in countries with different historical and political traditions. These countries were all situated in the central-eastern European border lands. The control of these lands was at stake in World War I and in World War II. After World War I the two competitors for this control, Germany and Russia, were both defeated and weak, and this fortuitous circumstance allowed the central-eastern European nations full sovereignty and a life according to their national traditions and desires (a situation which they did not, unfortunately, put to the best use). The USSR alone, however, emerged as victor from World War II and gained preponderant influence in this area.

Communist governments were instituted in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-

gary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, countries which in the preceding decades had lived rarely under democratic and mostly under semi-Fascist regimes, but in any case under anti-Communist governments. All these countries were very weak in comparison with the USSR. The Communist regimes established there, with the exception, perhaps, of Yugoslavia, depended on the support of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Some of the Communist nations like Poland and Czechoslovakia depended also on protection by the power of the USSR against potential claims of a West Germany which would regain its strength.

The relationship of the USSR as the oldest and most powerful Communist regime to the weak young Communist regimes in these Satellites presented an entirely new problem to Communist leadership. The USSR, especially under Stalin, was a strictly centralized Communist State in which one will and one will alone was decisive, a monolithic State admitting no diversity and demanding the strictest identity not only of ideology but also of policy and institutions. Most of the members of the Communist ruling elite in the new Communist lands had been for many years not national leaders but agents of international Communism, i.e., agents of the USSR. The Communist leaders of the USSR continued to regard these men as mere agents of Moscow, and not primarily as the leaders of

formally sovereign nations and Communist fellow-States. Thus the first fifteen years after World War II witnessed the difficult process of accommodation from the mentality of a monolithic Communist empire based on a historical national tradition which always had disregarded the rights of the subject nationalities, to that of a Communist "Commonwealth." This new grouping of theoretically sovereign and equal nations had, on the basis of a common ideology, to take into account on the one hand the preponderance of the USSR in power and in historical achievement, and on the other hand the particular and often conflicting national traditions and power interests of the various States. The relationship was made even more complicated by the emergence of Asian Communist nations (there are at present four), of which one, China, though junior in the history of Communism, was in power potentially superior to the USSR.

The complex history of this adjustment of Communist leadership to a new "international" situation within the Communist world has been brilliantly analyzed by Dr. Brzezinski, a young scholar of Polish descent, who fortunately combines an expert knowledge of the Soviet Union and its European Satellites with a penetrating insight into the complexities of political thought and theory. His new book, "The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict," which is jointly sponsored by two great Harvard institutes, The Russian Research Center and The Center for International Affairs, will help the reader understand the structure and dynamics of one of the

Hans Kohn is Professor of History at The City College of New York. He has written, among numerous other books, Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology, which will appear in a revised and enlarged edition in the fall in Vintage Russian Library, and The Mind of Modern Russia, Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age.

decisive areas of our time, an area where realities are often buried under an official doctrinaire phraseology. The book represents the first effort to establish a conceptual framework within which the shifting relationships of a supra-national and universal Communist ideology and of national power interests can be understood and from which cautious conclusions for the future can be drawn. It is a pleasure to know that the conclusions drawn by Dr. Brzezinski are truly cautious and do not support the sanguine hopes of those who expect that the undeniable tensions existing within the Communist Commonwealth must lead to its perhaps fatal weakening.

Four Phases

Dr. Brzezinski distinguishes four phases in the rise and development of the "Socialist Commonwealth," concentrating mainly on eastern Europe. The first phase covered the years from 1945 to 1947, when a great institutional and ideological diversity prevailed among the new Communist States. In that period Czechoslovakia was the "least" Communist and Yugoslavia the most, Tito being then widely regarded as Stalin's fair-haired boy. The rapid demobilization and disengagement of Western forces in the area and the weakness of the democratic elements there probably came as a surprise to the Soviet leadership. Hence it was decided to change the then still-existing relative flexibility of institutional and ideological diversity in the Satellite region. Diversity had apparently outlived its usefulness. As an antithesis the Cominform was established.

Thus the second phase started, which lasted until 1953. In it Stalin enforced conformity in the bloc and no possible difference between the USSR-led Communist interests and those of the various non-Russian States was recognized. It was the famous period of purges, which however did not solve the fundamental difficulties in the relationship between the USSR and the Satellites. "Even totalitarian ideologies," the author rightly remarks (p. 138), "dogmatic almost by definition, must respond in some measure to domestic aspirations

and must somehow reflect the existing reality, even while striving to change it altogether." Stalinist rigidity did not allow any innovation or experimentation in the newly created relationship among Communist States and merely applied Stalinist domestic methods to theoretically international relations. During that period Yugoslavia left the bloc and Czechoslovakia became the most rigid Stalinist member of the camp.

The third phase reached from Stalin's death to the year 1956 and was again a period when, following the swing of the pendulum, institutional and ideological diversity made itself felt and was even officially recognized, perhaps most strongly in the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of June 20, 1956, which said: "the roads and conditions of Socialist development are different in different countries . . . any tendency to impose one's own views in determining the roads and forms of Socialist development are alien to both sides." For a brief time there was even a threat that Titoism might be exported and might compete with the Soviet brand of Communism for leadership or influence in the Soviet bloc. The result was the Hungarian attempt to establish a national Communism stressing national interests above a common ideology and the more successful Polish attempt to follow distinct domestic policies without breaking the very close ties with the Soviet Union. It is in the pages on Poland that Dr. Brzezinski's analysis excels and that his judicious observations will be most illuminating even for close students of developments in the area.

The "Polish October" clearly put the problem of where to draw the borderline between the legitimate national or domestic concerns of a Communist leadership and the ideological unity of the Communist camp as a whole. The task after 1956 was to forge "new bonds of unity to prevent the diversity from becoming political disunity" (p. 265). That was the task of the fourth phase. There was no return to Stalinism but rather an effort to establish a balance between ideological uniformity and institutional diversity. The Moscow Declaration of November 1957 spoke

of basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on the "Socialist" path, manifested everywhere alongside the great variety of historically formed national features and traditions which should be taken into account without fail.

Chinese Intervention

It was in this situation that the Chinese Communists intervened decisively for the first time in the world Communist movement. At the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957 Chou En-lai visited Moscow and Eastern Europe. His major theme was unity and the recognition of Soviet leadership. China's insistence on unity was supported strongly by many East European Communist governments, especially those of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Republic. Thus it came about that the struggle for the emphasis on the unity of the camp was carried not by Moscow, but by Peking and Prague. This, as Dr. Brzezinski points out, had the gradual effect of making Moscow appear Warsaw's best friend, thereby making Warsaw more responsive to Moscow. The following two years brought Poland's grudging subordination to Moscow's leadership and a renewed fight against Yugoslav revisionism. Ideological unity was found insufficient to insure common action without some recognized central leadership.

The Communist bloc under Khrushchev's leadership successfully weathered the crisis which threatened to disrupt it as the result of Khrushchev's Congress speech in February 1956, and of the Hungarian and Polish upheavals in October of that fateful year. It is interesting to note Dr. Brzezinski's judgment of Khrushchev's leadership in this crisis. He succeeded in weaving together "a new fabric of unity which satisfied the centralists, which isolated Tito, and which subordinated Gomulka. . . . Although this was not the triumphant fulfillment of Khrushchev's 1955-1956 vision, it did involve the reconsolidation of the structure which the events of 1956 had shaken. In achieving this Khrushchev relied much more than Stalin had on the support of the other Communist leaderships. It must also be

said that his energy, his elasticity, his tactical sense, his ability to satisfy the centralists and to enlist the anti-Stalinists, deserve a good share of the credit. And he certainly showed a capacity to learn from his errors." (p. 331f.)

Poland has traveled a long road from its October to the present. It has gradually become more, and not less, Communist. It has preserved a measure of domestic autonomy without external ideological ambitions. To a certain degree Polish national interests have merged with the ruling Communist Party. Though the Poles' hostility to Communism and Russia continues, their geographic situation and the problem of their western border make many of them prefer to play the second role among the Communist States in Europe rather than occupy a lowly rank in a Western alliance, in which Germany plays a preponderant role.

A greater problem than Poland is posed to Communist leadership by China. Though the Chinese continue to proclaim Soviet leadership, the actual and potential greatness of China undermines the hierarchical character of international Communism. But Dr. Brzezinski warns against expecting too much from the inevitable strains which will occur. Russia

and China share common ideological aspirations and a common hostility to the outside world. Thus they are bound together by a combination of power and ideology.

The Communist Commonwealth or Empire is relatively young. During the fifteen years of its existence it has gone through a continuous process of change and adjustment. The feudal and absolutist relationship of the first years after World War II has given way "to a structure of hierarchical contingencies, with the USSR occupying the undisputed first place but necessarily displaying great responsiveness to the often conflicting aspirations of the other Communist States." On the ability of the Communist leaders to adjust graciously to the inevitable changes in the various countries will depend the future unity and probably the very survival of the Communist camp.

The very great diversity of national traditions in an Euro-Asian bloc, which includes Prague and Moscow, Warsaw and Peking, is being bridged by a common ideology which regards Socialism as a form of social and political organization that will and must replace a capitalism inevitably doomed by the process of history; which is convinced of the necessity to stimulate internal social change in

the Communist countries through rapid socialization and industrialization; and which firmly believes that because of external threat from the capitalist world the Communist Parties must maintain their unity through centralized leadership and basic similarities in action. This unity cannot be imposed by force alone. It must be based on a common ideological commitment. This commitment distinguishes the Communist Empire from all previous empires and commonwealths. The diversity within the Empire, Dr. Brzezinski argues in his conclusion, need not be an augury of approaching doom but may act as a safety valve for the tension which Stalinism merely attempted to suppress by violence. "The ultimate danger to the Communist camp is not the potential waning of Soviet power but the gradual erosion of the common ingredient of ideological commitment. . . . For this to take place, however, the ideology must first be denied both victories and enemies, a difficult and paradoxical task since denial of one can be construed as a manifestation of the other." The image of the future drawn by Dr. Brzezinski may not convince all his readers but none will fail to recognize the unusual thoughtfulness and power of analysis of his book.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (continued from page 41)

Sofia, July 6. State purchasing agents are now authorized to take pigs at the established State prices in exchange for fodder mixtures which are to be sold at a discount. Moreover, higher prices are to be paid to these private producers for male calves which will be further fattened on State farms. The decree also instructs the collective farm managers to consider the needs of the members' private plots when distributing forage from the 1960 crops, requiring that a proportional share be allocated to each.

ROMANIA

(The Romanian Party Congress, attended by Khrushchev and the Satellite Party leaders, is discussed on pages 3-10.)

Minister Dismissed

Carol Loncear, Minister of Heavy Industry, has been dismissed from this post. (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], June 30.) He

was replaced by Constantin Tuzu, the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee. The dismissal of Loncear was no surprise, since Premier Chivu Stoica had specifically criticized his Ministry for bureaucratic inefficiency in a report before the Third Party Congress in June.

Amnesty Decreed

Those who have violated government regulations regarding the declaration of foreign currency and gold were pardoned, if such a declaration was made within sixty days after the decree was published in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), June 16. Most jail sentences for currency violators were also terminated under the new ruling. Recently, the Romanian government has been successful in reaching agreements with Western nations which had previously refused to release funds of Romanian citizens. The new amnesty may have been a move to root out badly-needed foreign currency, still hidden abroad.

Recent and Related

Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, edited by Vladimir Gsovski and Kazimierz Grzybowski (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, 2067 pp., \$30.00). This monumental, two-volume book is a survey of the legal system of the Soviet Union, together with the present-day laws of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The research was done by lawyers from the countries concerned, most of them trained in American law as well as in that of their motherlands. "It seems neither possible nor worthwhile to cover in a single work all the ramifications of governmental, legal and judicial systems of eleven countries. Thus, the research was focused not on the legal technicalities and details but on the effects of the legal system on the rights of the people." Each of the seven parts of the book treats a topic in its relation first to the Soviet Union, and then to each of the other countries covered. Part I deals with the origin and special features of the present regime and law; Part II, the administration of justice; Part III, judicial procedure; Part IV, substantive criminal law; Part V, the sovietization of civil law; Part IV, worker and factory; and Part VII, land and peasant. Bibliography and index of names, places and subjects.

To Moscow—and Beyond, by Harrison E. Salisbury (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960, 301 pp., \$4.95). Mr. Salisbury first became acquainted with Russia during World War II and spent the succeeding fifteen years studying the lands behind the Iron Curtain, much of the time as resident correspondent of *The New York Times* in Moscow. This is his account of the Soviet Union revisited in 1959. After traveling 30,000 miles throughout Russia, including two trips to Siberia and an extended stay in Mongolia, he observes and contrasts the changes that have occurred there in recent years. In addition, he presents his views on some of the major political questions of our time: the nature and intentions of the Khrushchev regime, Soviet-Chinese relations, and American policies toward Communist countries. Illustrations, index.

History of Hungary, by Denis Sinor (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960, 310 pp., \$5.00). Basically, this volume is a political history of Hungary, but it also traces the cultural, social and economic trends which have molded Hungary in the past. The book begins with the nomadic Magyar tribes in Europe before the establishment of the Christian kingdom. It goes on to describe the dynasty of the Arpads, the elected kings at the zenith of Hungarian power, then the divided kingdom, and finally the Habsburg rule. The last chapter is devoted to the Horthy era between the two World Wars. Denis Sinor, the author of several works on historical and political subjects, now teaches courses in Hungarian and Altaic studies at Cambridge University in England. Index.

The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, by R. Conquest (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960, 203 pp., \$6.75). This is a documentary study of seven minority nations of the USSR whose populations were deported from their native territories during the last war: the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, inhabiting the steppe southwest of Astrakhan, and the Mohammedan nations of the Crimea and the North Caucasus. The author's aim is "to present the documentation, which does not seem to have been so assembled before, in a form convenient for students of the matter, and at the same time to give, as a context, enough of the background to make it easy for the general reader to follow the story." He relies mainly on Soviet sources, but also summarizes information gathered from refugees and other unofficial sources. Mr. Conquest has been a research fellow of the London School of Economics and Political Science. The book contains six maps.

Socialism in One Country: 1924-1926, by Edward Hallett Carr (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960, 493 pp., \$7.50). The present volume is the sixth in Mr. Carr's massive ten-volume *History of Soviet Russia*, and the second of three covering the period 1924-1926 under the collective title *Socialism in One Country*. To complete the history there will be three additional volumes dealing with

1926-1929, entitled *Foundations of a Planned Economy*. The sixth volume opens in 1924 with the final defeat of Trotsky by the combined forces of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and goes on to trace the steps by which Stalin ousted his two colleagues from power. The book also deals with the general political history of the period, with the complex organization of the party and the Komsomol, the constitutional structure of the USSR, the Red Army and the Secret Police, the increasing regimentation of literature, and Stalin's final creation of "Socialism in one country." Index.

The History of Modern Bulgarian Literature, by Clarence A. Manning and Roman Smal-Stocki (New York: Bookman Assoc., 1960, 198 pp., \$4.00). Since very little is known about modern Bulgarian literature, and only two of its greatest authors—Khristo Botev and Ivan Vazov—have been translated into English, this new book by Professor Manning of Columbia University and Professor Smal-Stocki of the Slavic Institute of Marquette University is particularly valuable. The emphasis is historical, tracing literary development from the Bulgarian renaissance in the 18th Century through the liberation from Turkey in 1878 to the present situation under Communism. The last chapter presents selections from Bulgarian poetry. Notes, selected bibliography. Index.

The Soviet Design for a World State, by Elliot R. Goodman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, 512 pp., \$6.75). To discover the Soviet design and method for reshaping the world, Mr. Goodman has analyzed Communist writings, current and historical, and traced the evolution and changes in Soviet ideology. He discusses the revival of Russian nationalism, the policies of "Socialism in one country" and "peaceful coexistence," the Soviet world political structure, and Soviet views on the development of a single world culture and language. Mr. Goodman's findings lead him to the conclusion that the Kremlin has never abandoned its goal of a world State. He argues the need for a reevaluation of Western attitudes toward the Soviet system in order to meet the challenge. Index.



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